Duquesne Law Review
Volume 25

Number 2

Article 3

1987

An Examination of Discrimination Under the Pennsylvania Civil
Service Act
Debra Punsky Rand

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Debra P. Rand, An Examination of Discrimination Under the Pennsylvania Civil Service Act, 25 Duq. L. Rev.
209 (1987).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol25/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Duquesne Law Review
Volume 25, Winter 1987, Number 2

Articles
An Examination of Discrimination Under The
Pennsylvania Civil Service Act
Debra Punsky Rand*
In 1963, the General Assembly amended the Civil Service Act'
by adding section 905.1.2 This section reads as follows:
No officer or employe of the Commonwealth shall discriminate against any
person in recruitment, examination, appointment, training, promotion, retention or any other personnel action with respect to the classified service
because of political or religious opinions or affiliations because of labor
union affiliations or because of race, national origin or other non-merit
factors.

The purpose of this article is to examine this amendment, and specifically the criteria required to fall within its ambit, to analyze the
restrictions implicit in this amendment, to evaluate the wisdom of
* J.D. 1984, Dickinson School of Law. Former Law Clerk with the Pennsylvania Civil

Service Commission. Current Judicial Law Clerk with The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. The author would like to express her appreciation to James S. Marshall, Esq. for
his astute suggestions on the analysis appearing in this article. Thanks also to the Legal
Office and the Office of Appeals of the State Civil Service Commission and to Jane Kessel
and David B. Torrey, Esq. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the
author unless otherwise clearly indicated.
1. Act of August 5, 1941, P.L. 752, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.1 et seq.
(Purdon 1962 and Supp. 1986) [hereinafter cited as the Civil Service Act].
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.905(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986). Section 905.1 was added to
the Civil Service Act by section 25 of the Act of August 27, 1963, P.L. 1257.
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using this amendment as a catch-all provision for correcting "injustices" and to consider some of the major legal questions, both
constitutional and statutory, that it has generated.
I.

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

Prior to the enactment of section 905.1, the Civil Service Act
granted only a limited right of appeal on the basis of discrimination. Discrimination actions brought by disgruntled employees
against employers (appointing authorities) under the Act were limited to instances involving complaints of a regular status employee's improper removal pursuant to section 807,1 and improper
demotion pursuant to section 706.' Interestingly, the statutes pertaining to furlough, section 802, 5 and suspension, section 803,6 did
not specifically prohibit discrimination. In addition, the State Civil
3. The removal of a regular status employee can be effected only for just cause. See
Section 807 of the Civil Service Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 747.807 (Purdon
1962)(amended 1963).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.706 (Purdon 1962) (amended 1963). There is no statutory standard for an involuntary demotion but because a demotion has the effect of removing the employee from the higher level position it is suggested that the demotion of a regular status employee should be subject to the just cause standard.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.802 (Purdon 1962) (amended 1963). A furlough may be
implemented by an "appointing authority" only because of a lack of work or a lack of funds
pursuant to section 3(s) of the Civil Service Act. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.3(s) (Purdon
Supp. 1986). In addition, in determining which employees are to be furloughed, a 1963
amendment to section 802 dictates the order of furlough, absent a collective bargaining
agreement containing provisions that it, and not section 802, applies.
The term "appointing authority" is the statutory term for "officers, board, commission,
person or group of persons having power by law to make appointments in the classified
service." Section 741.3(e) (Purdon Supp. 1986). It is generally understood that personnel
actions may be validly implemented only by the appointing authority. See, e.g., Moore v.
Commonwealth, 1 Pa. Commw. 73, 272 A.2d 283 (1970).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.803 (Purdon 1962) (amended 1963). The suspension of a
regular status employee can be effected only for good cause. State Civil Service Commission
regulation 101.21, 4 PA. CODE § 101.21 (Shepard's 1986), sets forth the types of actions
which, if proven, can establish good cause. The list does not purport to be exhaustive and it
is generally understood that actions constituting good cause for suspension may also be sufficient to rise to the level of just cause for removal. For example, habitual lateness may
merit either suspension or removal depending upon facts unique to a particular case such as
the number of times the employee was late, the employee's duties, and the presence or
absence of prior warnings. It is, however, the appointing authority which elects the personnel action. Moreover, case law is clear that the State Civil Service Commission has no power
to substitute a different personnel action or second guess the appointing authority. See
Omelchenko v. Hous. Auth., 58 Pa. Commw. 94, 428 A.2d 274 (1981).
For newcomers to civil service law it should be pointed out that regulation 101.21 formerly read "good cause for suspension shall be a just cause ...
" The mention of the statutory standard for removal in the context of a regulation dealing with suspension was misleading and the language has been altered to clarify the matter.
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Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission)
had and still has the power to institute show cause or investigatory
7
proceedings.
Thus, under the pre-1963 scenario most personnel actions were
not appealable. No probationary employees or provisional employee" had any right of appeal whatsoever. In addition, many personnel actions involving regular status employees were not appealable to the Commission. Included among these were transfer or
reassignment,"° leave of absence, unfavorable performance evaluation report (PER),1 reclassification 2 and non-selection for
7. The authority to conduct hearings in all of the aforementioned actions appears in
section 203 of the Civil Service Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.203 (Purdon 1962)
(amended 1963) and in section 951(a), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.951(d) (Purdon Supp.
1986). "Show cause" hearings usually pertain to issues such as whether an employee violated
section 904 of the Civil Service Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.904 (Purdon Supp. 1986)
(pertaining to the prohibition of certain political activities) and whether an employee violated section 902 of the Civil Service Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.902 (Purdon 1962)
(relating to falsification of a civil service application). In addition, the Commission can hold
investigatory hearings on issues such as misapplication of eligibility lists by an appointing
authority.
8. A probationary employee is one undergoing a probationary period which is defined
as "a preliminary period of employment prior to permanent appointment of an employe for
the purpose of determining his fitness for permanent employment." Section 3(t) of the Civil
Service Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.3(t) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
9. Provisional employee is not defined in the Civil Service Act but provisional appointments are permitted only when there is an urgent need to fill a vacancy and the director of
the State Civil Service Commission is unable to certify ai eligible list and no regular civil
service examination is immediately available. See section 604 of the Civil Service Act, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.604 (Purdon Supp. 1986). The Civil Service Act also provides for
temporary appointments to extra positions, see section 605, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.605
(Purdon 1962) and emergency appointments, see section 606 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.606
(Purdon 1962). The distinctions are unimportant for purposes of this article. The point is
that none of these employees has regular status, which is granted only after completion of
the probationary period. See section 3(k) of the Civil Service Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §
741.3(k) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
10. Transfer and reassignment are implemented pursuant to section 705 of the Civil
Service Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.705 (Purdon Supp. 1986). Whether the action is a
transfer or a reassignment depends upon whether the employee is moved from one position
to another within the same appointing authority (reassignment) or another appointing authority (transfer). See Commission regulation 99.21, 4 PA. CODE § 99.21 (Shepard's 1986).
11. Performance evaluation reports (PERs) are issued pursuant to section 704 of the
Civil Service Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.704 (Purdon 1962) and Commission regulations 99.11 - 99.15, 4 PA. CODE §§ 99.11 - 99.15 (Shepard's 1986). The reports are issued
during the month of the anniversary date, see Sebastiani v. Dep't of Transp., 75 Pa.
Commw. 602, 462 A.2d 942 (1983), of the regular status employee and prior to the expiration
of the probationary period for probationers. The importance of these reports cannot be underestimated because they can be utilized to determine promotion and order of furlough. As
with any other personnel action they must be appealed to the Commission within twenty
days of their issuance to the employee. This is a critical point because frequently the significance of a "bad" PER will not be evident until a promotion or a furlough is implemented.
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promotion.
This may be long after the twenty day appeal period and at that point attack upon the PER
will not be permitted. Interim PERs are not appealable. They are in the nature of progress
reports indicating improvement or decline in work and are not utilized for determining furlough order or promotion.
12. Reclassification downward, which is implemented under authority of Commission
regulation 99.42, 4 PA. CODE § 99.42 (Shepard's 1986), is a troublesome problem. It involves
altering the status of an employee from one position to a lower position because over a
period of time the employee's work duties have changed. It is frequently confused with involuntary demotion. An involuntary demotion, however, involves (1) a "change to a position
in a class carrying a lower maximum salary," section 3(r) of the Civil Service Act, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 71, § 741.3(r) (Purdon Supp. 1986), and (2) unsatisfactory performance, section 706
of the Civil Service Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.706 (Purdon Supp. 1986). In reclassification downward, salary is not taken away, but future increments may be lost.
A recent decision has cast doubt upon whether reclassification downward continues to
exist as a valid personnel action. In McHale v. Dep't of Transp., Pa. Commw. -,
514
A.2d 290 (1986), the court held that where an employee is reclassified downward before he
has reached the top salary range in the pre-reclassification stage, the personnel action taken
is, definitionally, a demotion. In other words, the denial of future merit increments to which
the employee might have become entitled had he not been reclassified downward renders
the action an involuntary demotion. While the Civil Service Act does not specifically require
that a demotion be "for cause," the better view is that such cause is required. See note 4. In
cases of reclassification downward, fault-based conduct is not at issue and hence if reclassification downward is indeed an involuntary demotion it is probably an invalid demotion because it is implemented without "cause."
The dissent in McHale astutely recognizes that:
[Tihe majority opinion, in deciding whether a change to a position in a class carrying
a lower maximum salary has occurred, compares only the maximum salaries of the
two pay ranges in question. This cannot be the correct comparison because every
time an employee is reclassified downward, the maximum salary in the reclassified
position will always be less than the maximum salary in the pre-reclassified position.
Yet, reclassification downward is specifically authorized in Commission Regulation
99.42 . ..
Id. at -,
514 A.2d at 293. (Emphasis in original). The dissent, in addition, points to case
law sustaining reclassification downward as a valid personnel action.
The impact of McHale has not yet been felt, but if the case can be taken at its literal
word, once an employee is classified and his duties are later changed because of reasons such
as computerization or a reduction in the workload the employee must continue to be paid
the higher level salary for duties no longer being done by him. The real loser in such cases is
the taxpayer.
The other major difficulty in the current case law with respect to reclassification downward is a jurisdictional problem. Initially, the Commission had jurisdiction over classification issues. See section 203(2) of the Civil Service Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.203(2)
(Purdon 1962). But section 203 was amended and classification as well as compensation
issues were transferred to the Executive Board. Compare former section 203(2) with section
203, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.203 (Purdon Supp. 1986). See also section 707 of the Civil
Service Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.707 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
The Commonwealth Court recognized this legislative change in Gorton v. State Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 35 Pa. Commw. 319, 385 A.2d 1026 (1978). Gorton was clearly the state of the law
until the Commonwealth Court issued Ermel v. Dep't of Transp., 79 Pa. Commw. 431, 470
A.2d 1061 (1984). The Ermel court, without reference to Gorton or its progeny, remanded a
case to the State Civil Service Commission to determine whether an employee had ever
occupied a particular position. Subsequent to Ermel the Commonwealth Court filed Behm
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The 1963 amendment thus created a right of appeal for all nonregular tatus employees and significantly extended the right of
appeal previously held by regular status employees.
II.

HEARINGS AUTHORIZED UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE ACT

Pursuant to section 951(a) of the Civil Service Act 13 any regular
status employee may appeal any permanent separation, suspension, furlough or demotion on the grounds that the appealed action
was taken in violation of the Civil Service Act. Section 951(a)
grants the employee the right to a public hearing, and a report
(adjudication) containing findings of fact and legal conclusions.
v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 90 Pa. Commw. 207, 494 A.2d 1166 (1985), which again reiterated the Gorton position. A few days later the Commonwealth Court filed Benzo v. Office of
Employment Sec. (No. 451 C.D. 1982 filed June 24, 1985), an unpublished case which relied
upon Ermel. Pursuant to Commonwealth Court's internal operating rules an unpublished
opinion may not be cited as precedent. See 210 PA. CODE § 67.55 (Shepard's 1986). Thus,
Behm would appear to represent the current state of the law. It is submitted that the Gorton/Behm position is correct because there has been no further legislation altering the jurisdiction of the State Civil Service Commission on classification matters since Gorton was
decided. The Behm court clearly stated that even where a personnel action exists, it must be
one over which the Commission had jurisdiction in order to fall within the ambit of section
905.1. For other cases considering this jurisdictional problem, see Wetzel v. State Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 77 Pa. Commw. 47, 465 A.2d 69 (1983) (Commission lacks jurisdiction over classification issues); Carr v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 72 Pa. Commw. 78, 456 A.2d 240 (1983) (jurisdiction over classification issues rests with the Executive Board); O'Peil v. State Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 16 Pa. Commw. 467, 332 A.2d 879 (1975) (adoption of uniform compensation plan
which does not provide merit increment is not a personnel action and the Commission was
without jurisdiction to consider the employee's appeal); but see Dep't of Transp. v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 9 Pa. Commw 341, 306 A.2d 428 (1973) (an Executive Board resolution
which established maximum non-uniform salaries and operated to deny merit increments to
some employees was a personnel action). Department of Transportation,it should be noted,
pre-dates Gorton.
The case law instructs that an employee appealing reclassification downward may do so
before the State Civil Service Commission, but only upon a discrimination theory. Thus,
employees challenging the correctness of the reclassification should direct complaints to the
Executive Board, which until recently was required to grant the aggrieved employee a due
process hearing. See Orage v. Office of Admin., 85 Pa. Commw. 497, 482 A.2d 1174 (1984),
rev'd, __ Pa. -,
515 A.2d 852 (1986).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.951(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986). This section provides:
(a) Any regular employe in the classified service may, within twenty calender days of
receipt of notice from the appointing authority, appeal in writing to the commission.
Any permanent separation, suspension for cause, furlough or demotion on the
grounds that such action had been taken in his case in violation of the provisions of
this act, upon receipt of such notice of appeal, the commission shall promptly schedule and hold a public hearing. As soon as practicable after the conclusion of the hearing the commission shall report its findings and conclusions to the appointing authority and the employe. If such final decision is in favor of the employe, the appointing
authority shall reinstate him with the payment of so much of the salary or wages lost
by him as the commission may in its discretion order.
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Under this section, the State Civil Service Commission is empowered, upon finding in favor of the employee, to reinstate the employee "with the payment of so much of the salary or wages lost by
him as the commission may in its discretion order."' 4 Pursuant to
Commission regulation 105.15'1 the burden of establishing a prima
facie case in a section 951(a) appeal rests on the appointing
authority.
The section 951(a) right of appeal must be contrasted with that
established under section 951(b)."6 The latter permits "any person" who is aggrieved by section 905.1 to appeal. While it also provides for a public hearing and the issuance of an adjudication, it is
distinguishable from section 951(a) for several reasons. First, the
language does not limit the right of appeal to regular status employees, nor does it contain a restricted list of appealable actions.
Second, it grants the State Civil Service Commission, upon finding
in favor of the aggrieved person, authority to "make such order as
it deems appropriate to assure the person such rights as are accorded him by this act.' 1 7 Third, Commission regulation 105.1618
places on the employee asserting a section 951(b) claim the burden
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
The last type of appeal, which is under section 951(d),' 9 pertains
to the Commission's investigatory hearings. Such hearings may be
held sua sponte or by motion "to assure observance of the provisions of this act and the rules and regulations thereunder."20
III.

THE STATUTORY ELEMENTS OF SECTION

905.1

Section 905.1 contains three separate elements, all of which must
be met for a claim to fall within its provisions.
14. Id. For an interesting case construing "salary or wages" under section 951(a), see
Elias v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, Pa. Commw. __,
511 A.2d 887 (1986).
15. 4 PA. CODE § 105.15 (Shepard's 1986).
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.951(b) (Purdon Supp. 1986). This Section provides:
(b) Any person who is aggrieved by an alleged violation of section 905.1 of this act
may appeal in writing to the commission within twenty calender days of the alleged
violation. Upon receipt of such notice of appeal, the commission shall promptly
schedule and hold a public hearing. As soon as practicable after the conclusion of the
hearing, the commission shall report its findings and conclusions to the aggrieved
person and other interested parties. If such final decision is in favor of the aggrieved
person, the commission shall make such order as it deems appropriate to assure the
person such rights as are accorded him by this act.
17. Id.
18. 4 PA. CODE § 105.16 (Shepard's 1986).
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.951(d) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
20. Id. See also note 7.
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First, the statute provides that " [n]o officer or employe . . .
shall discriminate. . . ." The question of what constitutes discrimination under the Act will be considered in detail later in this
article.
The second element is that the discrimination must be in the
form of a personnel action. This requirement occasionally causes
difficulties and contradictory case law exists. Commission regulation 105.221 contains a list of personnel actions for which written
notice is required. This regulation is, however, silent on whether it
is an exhaustive list of all personnel actions or merely a list of all
personnel actions requiring written notice. The case law serves
only to confuse this question. The first case to consider this regula22
tion was Ellis v. Department of Transportation.
In Ellis, the employee appealed his furlough and in so doing sought to challenge
the PERs upon which his status for furlough purposes was properly premised. The Commission held the challenge to the PER untimely. It maintained that the report had to be appealed within 20
days of its issuance pursuant to the statute of limitations appearing in section 951(b) of the Civil Service Act. Ellis maintained that
there was no provision in the Civil Service Act governing the appeal of a PER and hence that he should be able to challenge the
report in the context of the civil service furlough proceeding. Commonwealth Court recognized that regulation 105.2(a)(14) specifi21. 4 PA. CODE § 105.2 (Shepard's 1986). This regulation reads as follows:
(a) Written notice shall be required for:
(1) Appointment.
(2) Promotion.
(3) Removal.
(4) Suspension.
(5) Demotion.
(6) Furlough.
(7) Retirement.
(8) Resignation.
(9) Transfer.
(10) Reassignment.
(11) Leave of absence.
(12) Extension or reduction of probationary period.
(13) Compensation changes, except salary increments, general pay increases, or special pay for such things as overtime or out-of-class work.
(14) Performance evaluation.
(b) The signature of the employe on the performance evaluation shall be evidence of
written notice of performance evaluation.
The language in regulation 105.2(a)(13) was amended effective March 30, 1985, see 15 Pa.
Admin. Bull. 1151, 1162, to include the words "general pay increases, or special pay for such
things as overtime or out-of-class work."
22. 33 Pa. Commw. 354, 381 A.2d 1325 (1978).
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cally included PERs among personnel actions subject to appeal
before the Commission and held that the Commission's resolution
23
of the timeliness issue was correct.
This regulation was next considered in Tempero v. Department
of Environmental Resources.2 4 In Tempero, two employees filed
appeals from reassignments under section 951(b). The appeals
were consolidated. Tempero maintained that she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex because she was deprived of
supervisory responsibilities. On this point, the Commonwealth
Court wrote:
While the responsibilities of her position did not include supervision over
other people, she was responsible for the supervision of a program. We cannot say that Tempero was in fact deprived of a supervisory position. In any
event, loss of supervisory authority, without more, is not a personnel action under the Act. See 4 Pa. Code § 105.2. As a result of the reassignment,

23. This case is an example of the importance of timely appeal of a PER as explained
in note 11.
An interesting extension of the right of appeal recognized in Ellis, Lehotzky v. State Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 82 Pa. Commw. 612, 477 A.2d 13 (1984), held that where an unfavorable
PER is withdrawn the Commission nonetheless remains empowered to grant ancillary relief
in the form of an order directing the appointing authority to rescind a letter of reprimand
which had been attached to the withdrawn PER.
The Lehotzky court stated:
With respect to the issue of whether there should be a rescission of the reprimand-

ing memorandum, however, we believe that the Commission's holding, that the question, of whether there should be a rescission, does not constitute an appealable personnel action, implicitly mischararcterizes the precise issue before it. Petitioner does
not present any assertion of a new subject of appeal. Instead, she has preserved a
request for ancillary relief stemming from the personnel action originally appealed,
i.e., the performance evaluation report. The real issue confronting this Court is
whether the Commission was obligated to proceed with a hearing for consideration of
that ancillary relief request where the employer agency has reversed the challenged
personnel action prior to the hearing on the merits, i.e., whether the agency, by unilaterally mooting the central challenge, can be assured of avoiding any further action
of the Commission.
Initially, Section 951(b) of the Civil Service Act, .... vests with the Commission the
authority to "make such order as it deems appropriate to assure . . . [a state employee] such rights as are accorded him" by the Civil Service Act. This clearly per-

mits the ordering of the rescission where the facts of the particular matter justify
such.

Id. at 615-16, 477 A.2d at 15 (brackets in original).
It was never asserted in Lehotzky that the letter was itself a personnel action. Thus, the
result in Lehotzky was to permit the Commission to exercise its remedial power under section 951(b) where the personnel action which is a requirement for a valid cause of action
under section 905.1 had been withdrawn. It is suggested that Lehotzky does not really do
away with the requirement of a personnel action. Instead, it can be limited to its facts,
including the allegation that the memorandum had been circulated among Lehotzky's colleagues and the fact that there was initially an appeal of a recognized personnel action.
24. 44 Pa. Commw. 235, 403 A.2d 226 (1979).
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Tempero did not lose her continued employment, her classification, any
part of her salary, any right to salary increases, or any right to promotions
as provided by the Act. We conclude, therefore, that Tempero has failed to
meet her burden of proving that the reassignment was based on sex.15

Thus, Tempero appears to construe Commission regulation 105.2
as an exhaustive list of all personnel action. Only six weeks later,
however, the Commonwealth Court issued Department of General
Services v. Johnson.2 6 In factual terms, Johnson is a fascinating
case. In Johnson, the employee, an equal opportunities development specialist V, had all of his duties assigned to a non-civil service employee. Johnson was given no assignments for eleven
months and eventually his entire office was moved to another floor
leaving Johnson behind with only a desk and chair. Johnson was
also the victim of an unsatisfactory PER (later withdrawn pending
re-evaluation) and a suspension. With respect to the loss of his duties, Johnson filed an appeal which the Commission dismissed after determining in an investigatory hearing that no personnel action had occurred. Subsequently it held, inter alia, that the
withdrawal of Johnson's work assignments was discriminatory and
hence ordered reinstatement of the duties. The issue before Commonwealth Court was "whether the Commission had the power to
investigate and determine issues regarding the removal of duties
once assigned to Johnson and to order reinstatement of said duties.

2

7

The appointing authority maintained that its action consti-

tuted only managerial supervision and thus was not a personnel
action within the meaning of section 905.1. In disagreeing with this
argument, the court cited regulation 105.2 (which clearly does not
specify that loss of duties is a personnel action) and wrote that
"[t]he regulation does not purport to provide an exclusive listing
[of personnel actions]. '"28 The court then rationalized that such a
drastic change in duties was "analogous to a demotion or reassignment" ' and thus constituted a personnel action. Additionally, the
court indicated that the failure or refusal to give an employee any
work assignments whatsoever is not a usual managerial act. 0 The
result in Johnson appears correct and its recognition that regulation 105.2 is not a complete list of all personnel actions is astute
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 237 n.2, 403 A.2d at 228 n.2 (emphasis added).
45 Pa. Commw. 245, 405 A.2d 596 (1979).
Id. at 248, 405 A.2d at 597.
Id. at 249, 405 A.2d at 597.
Id.
Id. at 249-50, 405 A.2d at 597-98.
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because this reading of the regulation allows for flexibility when
unforeseen actions are taken against employees. But Johnson
seems to be contradictory to Tempero's narrow reading of the
regulation.
The Court adhered to the Johnson view in Taylor v. State Civil
Service Commission,3" a non-selection for promotion case. In Taylor, the court, although it noted that non-selection for promotion is
not a personnel action listed in regulation 105.2, indicated that
such an action is nonetheless appealable under section 905.1. Taylor is a timeliness case and because the appeal was held untimely
the merits were never reached. However, in Butler v. State Civil
Service Commission,32 another non-selection case, the court reversed the Commission's determination that the appeals of nonselectees were untimely and remanded "for disposition on the merits.""3 Thus, the court has recognized the appealability of non-selection under section 951(b) although it is not a personnel action
listed under regulation 105.2. Taylor and Butler appear to stand
for the proposition that regulation 105.2 is not a complete list of
appealable actions.
More recently, in Coventry v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board,3 4 two employees attempted to appeal wage deductions.
Each employee was a manager of a liquor store where cash
shortages in handling deposits had occurred. The Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board conducted internal investigations, determined
that the managers were responsible for the losses, and thus deducted sums from their regular paychecks. The Commission held
that the pay reductions were not appealable personnel actions
under the Civil Service Act and rules. Commonwealth Court, apparently relying on regulation 105.2, indicated its agreement with
this holding.3 5 Thus, Coventry appears to follow the Tempero rationale that regulation 105.2 constitutes an exhaustive list of all
personnel actions, but ignores the dictum in Tempero as well as
regulation 105.2(13) both of which suggest that partial loss of salary is a personnel action.3 6
31. 67 Pa. Commw. 594, 447 A.2d 1098 (1982).
32. 57 Pa. Commw. 406, 426 A.2d 239 (1981).
33. Id. at 409, 426 A.2d at 241.
34. 81 Pa. Commw. 232, 473 A.2d 249 (1984).
35. Although Coventry quotes regulation 105.2 and states that the State Civil Service
Commission correctly determined that the pay reduction was not a personnel action, the
case does not directly state that personnel actions are restricted only to those listed in the
regulation.
36. Another example of a personnel action which is, in fact, appealable under section
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In assessing whether regulation 105.2 is or ought to be viewed as
the complete list of personnel actions as that term is used in section 905.1 the better rationale would appear to be that it ought
not. First, as Johnson notes, the regulation itself never purports to
be a complete listing of all actions, but only of all actions requiring
written notice. Second, Commonwealth Court has already, by precedent, permitted hearings on non-listed actions. 3 7 Third, allowing
actions not listed to be appealable permits the Commission to
adapt to meet new situations (such as the Johnson scenario) when
implemented.
Even under the broad view espoused in Johnson, however, not
every activity would constitute a personnel action. Consider a hypothetical situation where a supervisor has two subordinates, one a
Republican, the other a Democrat. The Democrat is senior to the
Republican, but the supervisor is also a Republican. An office with
a window view becomes available. The supervisor assigns the Republican to that office although the Democrat, the more senior employee, requests it. Even if the supervisor admitted that his choice
had been based upon his political bias, is the denial of a more desirable office a personnel action? Should such decisions be appealable? Section 2 of the Civil Service Act 8 sets forth the Act's
purpose:
Greater efficiency and economy in the administration of the government of
this Commonwealth is the primary purpose of this act. The establishment
of conditions of service which will attract to the service of the Commonwealth qualified persons of character and ability and their appointment and
promotion on the basis of merit and fitness are means to this end.

Certainly, persons will be more attracted to government service if
they believe they are treated fairly, but greater efficiency of administration will not be achieved if appointing authorities are required
to defend, against a charge of discrimination at a full blown due
process hearing, every minor decision. To construe "personnel action" too broadly is to usurp routine management decisions and
Johnson certainly did not suggest that managerial perogative is to
be lightly disregarded. Thus, the considerations of fair treatment
of the employee and decision-making rights of management must
be balanced cautiously.
951(b), although not specified in regulation 105.2, is reclassification downward. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Dep't of Gen. Servs., 91 Pa. Commw. 96, 496 A.2d 1268 (1985) [hereinafter cited
as Johnson v. D.G.S. to avoid confusion with the case cited in note 26]. See also note 12.
37. E.g., Taylor, Butler, Johnson v. D.G.S.
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.2 (Purdon 1962).
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The final element appearing in section 905.1 is that discrimination must take the form of a personnel action with respect to the
classified service. Thus, if a supervisor does not invite a Jewish
employee to his home for a picnic, but all co-employees are invited,
it would seem as though this conduct is neither a personnel action,
nor is it an activity related to the classified service. While it may
be evidence to show the supervisor's attitude toward the employee
in a recognized personnel action, the conduct itself is most likely
not actionable under section 905.1 of the Civil Service Act.
As noted earlier, the burden of proving discrimination under section 905.1 has been assigned to the employee pursuant to the procedures set forth in regulation 105.16. But the elements of a prima
facie case under regulation 105.16 are nowhere set forth in statute,
regulation or civil service case law. It is suggested that the prima
facie elements and presumptions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(Title VII) 3 9 are appropriate for civil service law in many, but not
all, instances. In order to understand and evaluate the appropriateness of applying Title VII law to the State Civil Service Act, it is
necessary to review this law, to examine Pennsylvania's application
of Title VII standards to state law, and to consider particularly the
unique development of discrimination law under the Civil Service
Act.

IV.

FEDERAL LAW UNDER TITLE

VII

Examination of employment discrimination under Title VII requires an initial determination of whether the alleged activity constitutes disparate treatment, disparate impact and/or present effects of past discrimination. Justice Larsen in his opinion in
support of affirmance in Winn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.40 astutely noted that these different theories must be distinguished.
Only the first two theories need be examined for our purposes
here.
As explained in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States,4 1 disparate treatment under Title VII occurs when
an employer treats some persons differently because of race, sex,
religion or other similar criteria. In such cases proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can be inferred in some in39.
40.
41.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. (1982) [hereinafter Title VII].
506 Pa. 138, 484 A.2d 392 (1984).
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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stances merely from the fact of the disparate treatment.2
Disparate impact cases involve employment practices that are
facially neutral but in application fall more harshly on one group
than another, and cannot be justified by business necessity."3 Proof
of discriminatory motive is not required in disparate impact
cases.

44

The United States Supreme Court enunciated the prima facie
elements applicable to a disparate treatment case in McDonnell
Douglas Corporation v. Green45 as follows:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the
statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may
be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued
to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.4
42. Id. at 335 n.15.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell, the employee, a black civil rights activist, protested his furlough by participating in a "stall-in" against the employer. This tactic consisted of a plan whereby members of a civil rights group intentionally and illegally stalled
their cars on the main roads leading to the employer's plant. Subsequent to this incident a
lock-in occurred. The lock-in, which involved chaining the doors of employer's plant to prevent ingress and egress, was conducted by members of a civil rights group of which Green
was chairman. The trial court found that Green actively participated in the lock-in activity
as well as the stall-in, but the court of appeals held that the evidence did not support the
finding with respect to the lock-in. The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to resolve the
factual issue pertaining to participation in the lock-in because Green had admitted participating directly in the stall-in incident.
Approximately three weeks after the lock-in, the employer publicly advertised for qualified mechanics, Green's trade. Green reapplied for a job and was rejected, according to the
employer, because of his participation in the above noted illegal activities. Green lost at the
district court level. The court of appeals agreed with the district court that the activities
Green participated in were illegal and were not protected civil rights activities under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). But the circuit court also determined that Green's claim under 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), which pertains generally to employment discrimination based upon,
inter alia, race, should not have been dismissed. The circuit court suggested that the employer's refusal to rehire was based upon subjective criteria and that Green should have
been given the opportunity to show that its reasons for refusing to hire him were a pretext.
46. Id. at 802. The McDonnell Court held that Green had established these elements.
In addition, the McDonnell Court noted that the facts will vary in a Title VII case and thus
"the prima facie proof required ... is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." Id. at 802 n.13.
The High Court recently held that the McDonnell test is inapplicable where the plaintiff
presents direct evidence of discrimination. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469
U.S. 111 (1985). In Trans World the direct evidence was that the company's method of
transfer available to a captain depended upon the captain's age.
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According to the McDonnell Court, if the employee establishes
these elements, the burden then shifts to the employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's
47
rejection. ,
What McDonnell did not make clear was first, whether the burden of persuasion ever shifted to the employer and second, how
the employee could rebut the employer's reasons for its personnel
decision. These questions were subsequently answered in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.45
After reviewing the prima facie burden previously enunciated in
McDonnell, the Burdine Court stated that "[t]he ultimate burden
of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff."4 9 According to the Burdine Court, the employer need only
rebut the presumption of discrimination established by the prima
facie case.50 "[It] need not persuade the court that it was actually
motivated by the proffered reasons."'" If the employer rebuts the
prima facie presumption by producing evidence that rejection was
for a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason, the presumption
drops from the case.52 The plaintiff, who retains the burden of persuasion, must then demonstrate that the proffered reason is a pretext.53 This can be done "directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." 54 It must be emphasized that under Burdine
the employer need only produce evidence that legitimate non-dis47. 411 U.S. at 802. The Court determined that the employer had articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the rejection and went on to explain that the circuit
court had "seriously underestimated the rebuttal weight" to be given this evidence. Id. at
803. On remand, according to the Court, Green was to be given a chance to show that the
employer's reasons for refusing to rehire him were a pretext.
48. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Briefly, Burdine involved the firing of an employee who was
later rehired in another department. Prior to her firing, she had applied for a supervisory
position which she was denied. She filed a Title VII action alleging that the refusal to promote her and her subsequent firing were based on gender discrimination.
49. Id. at 253.
50. Id. at 254.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 255.
53. Id. at 255-56.
54. Id. at 256. For an interesting article on the burdens under Burdine and their possible application to disparate impact cases see Smith, Employer Defenses in Employment
DiscriminationLitigation: A Reassessment of the Burdens of Proof and Substantive Standards Following Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 55 TEmp. L.Q. 372
(1982).
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criminatory reasons existed for its action. 5 It is not, in the context
of a non-selection for promotion case, required to persuade the
court that it had convincing objective reasons for preferring another job candidate. 6 Finally, according to Burdine, the employer
need not prove that the selectee was more qualified than the non-

selectee because Title VII permits the employer discretion in
57
choosing from a pool of equally qualified candidates.
The third case developing the Title VII burden in a disparate
treatment context is United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens.5 8 Aikens adds little to Burdine except a clear restatement that the employee is not required to submit direct evi59
dence of discriminatory intent.
Summarizing the salient principles, in disparate treatment cases
arising under Title VII, the prima facie case, if established, creates
a presumption of discrimination which if rebutted drops from the
case. The burden of persuasion remains at all times with the employee and discriminatory motive must be established.
The seminal case on disparate impact under Title VII is Griggs
v. Duke Power Company. The issue in Griggs was whether the
employer was prohibited under Title VII "from requiring a high
school education or passing of a standardized general intelligence
test as a condition of employment in or transfer to jobs when (a)
neither standard is shown to be significantly related to successful
job performance, (b) both requirements operate to disqualify Negroes at a substantially higher rate than white applicants, and (c)
the jobs in question formerly had been filled only by white employees as part of a longstanding practice of giving preference to
whites."6 The lower courts had ruled that a showing of discriminatory intent was necessary. The High Court rejected this idea indicating that under Title VII "practices, procedures, or tests neutral
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."6 Title VII prohibits not only overt
55. 450 U.S. at 254.
56. Id. at 256-57.
57. Id. at 259.
58. 460 U.S. 711 (1983). Aikens involved the employer's refusal to promote a black
employee. The reason given by the employer for its action was that Aikens had turned down
several lateral transfers which would have broadened his experience.
59. Id. at 717.
60. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
61. Id. at 425-26.
62. Id. at 430.
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discrimination, but "practices that are fair in form, but discrimina-

tory in operation."63 But, the Court further explained, "[t]he
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited." 4
Title VII, according to the Griggs Court, is directed not only to
the motivation of employment practices, but also their consequences. 5 Thus, under disparate impact cases, the relevant inquiry
becomes, does the practice exclude a protected group without the
justification of business necessity? Unlike the disparate treatment
case, intent to discriminate is not an element necessary to the
plaintiff's proof.
V.

TITLE

VII

AND PENNSYLVANIA

LAW

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in General Electric Corpora6 a disparate
tion v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission,"
impact case, specifically adopted the Griggs disparate impact rationale. The General Electric court read the "best able and most
competent to perform" clause in section 5 of the Human Relations
Act 7 as analogous to the business necessity doctrine judicially en63. Id. at 431.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 432.
66. 469 Pa. 292, 365 A.2d 649 (1976).
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Purdon Supp. 1986). This provision reads in pertinent
part:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, or in the case of a fraternal corporation or association, unless
based upon membership in such association or corporation, or except where based
upon applicable security regulations established by the United States or the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania:
(a) For any employer because of the race, color, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex,
national origin or non-job related handicap or disability of any individual to refuse to
hire or employ, or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual, or to
otherwise discriminate against such individual with respect to compensation, hire,
tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, if the individual is the best
able and most competent to perform the services required. The provision of this paragraph shall not apply, to (1) termination of employment because of the terms or conditions of any bona fide retirement or pension plan, (2) operation of the terms or
conditions of any bona fide retirement or pension plan which have the effect of a
minimum service requirement, (3) operation of the terms or conditions of any bona
fide group or employe insurance plan, (4) age limitations placed upon entry into bona
fide apprenticeship programs of two years or more approved by the State Apprenticeship and Training Council of the Department of Labor and Industry ....
Notwithstanding any provision of this clause, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice
for a religious corporation or association to hire or employ on the basis of sex in those
certain instances where sex is a bona fide occupational qualification because of the
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grafted onto Title VII disparate impact cases in Griggs. In addition, in General Electric the court recited the prima facie elements
set forth in McDonnell and, in Winn v. Trans World Airlines,
Chief Justice Nix, in his opinion in support of affirmance, reiterated that the four prong McDonnell test applies in "employment
discrimination cases" (as opposed to merely Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act cases). 68 Furthermore, the Commonwealth Court, appellate court for civil service appeals, 9 has applied Title VII law in
two State Civil Service cases. 0 Prior to examining the application
of Title VII law to the Civil Service Act, it is helpful to understand
the holding of the seminal State Civil Service discrimination case
heard by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Hunter v. Jones71 was decided only two years after section 905.1
was enacted. It concerned a most basic question-whether sections
905.1 and 951(b) afforded probationary employees a right of appeal
from an adverse personnel action on the basis of discrimination. It
was clearly a question of first impression and permitting the cause
of action would allow probationary employees a right of appeal
where they formerly had had none. 72 The Hunter court noted, in
particular, that sections 905.1 and 951(b) contained broad language
by the use of the words "any person" (as opposed to "any regular
employe" which appears in section 951(a)). 73 Accordingly, it recognized a right of appeal. It is of great importance that the Hunter
court's focus was on whether the right of appeal existed at all-not
on the technicalities of how the case should be tried. Nonetheless,
the end of the opinion contains a statement that an employee alleging discrimination must specifically recite the bases underlying
his claim and factually substantiate his claim at hearing.74 Alreligious beliefs, practices, or observances of that corporation, or association.
68. 506 Pa. at 141, 484 A.2d at 393-94. While General Electric involved the application of Title VII to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, Winn was a Pittsburgh
Human Relations Commissions case.
69. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 763(a) (Purdon 1981).
70. State Correctional Inst. at Graterford v. Goodridge, 87 Pa. Commw. 527, 487 A.2d
1036 (1985); Lynch v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 30 Pa. Commw. 235, 373 A.2d 469 (1977).
71. 417 Pa. 372, 207 A.2d 784 (1965), aff'd sub nom. after hearing, Hunter v. Pa. State
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 422 Pa. 158, 220 A.2d 879 (1966).
72. Interestingly, legislative debate is silent on section 905.1. There was, however,
lively debate as to whether long time state employees who were, pursuant to the 1963
amendments, being brought into the civil service system should, although they would be
probationers, have a right of appeal under section 951(a). The votes answered this question
in the negative. See Senate Legislative Journal 1028-31 (1963).
73. 417 Pa. at 375-76, 207 A.2d at 787.
74. Id. at 379, 207 A.2d at 788.
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though the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not addressed the
question of whether the McDonnell and Griggs tests are the way in
which one factually substantiates a claim under section 951(b) of
the Civil Service Act, it is suggested that these principles should be
generally applicable, subject to a recognition of certain limitations
within the Civil Service Act.
It is evident that disparate treatment is an activity prohibited by
section 905.1. The question of whether disparate impact also falls
within the ambit of that section has not been decided. At least one
does not directly fall
case has disparate impact overtones, but
75
under the definition of disparate impact.
There is, in addition, another category of cases not recognized in
Title VII. These cases rest upon a theory of procedural or factual
discrimination and have evolved because of the restricted right of
appeal under the Civil Service Act.
VI.

DISPARATE TREATMENT UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE ACT

As was stated earlier, disparate treatment cases under Title VII
require proof of discriminatory motive. The first State Civil Service case to specifically mention motive is Department of Revenue
v. State Civil Service Commission.76 In Department of Revenue, a
regular status employee appealed his removal under both sections
951(a) and 951(b) alleging that it had been effected for political
reasons, and not for just cause as the appointing authority asserted. The court indicated with respect to the discrimination issue
that the question was whether the employee "had carried his burden of proving that his removal was politically motivated. 7 7 The
motive requirement was also enunciated in Snipas v. Department
of Public Welfare.7 8 In Snipas, an employee appealed his furlough
under both sections 951 (a) and 951 (b) of the Civil Service Act.
His section 951 (b) claim was premised upon the fact that the appointing authority furloughed him, but retained several less senior
employees in violation of section 802 of the Civil Service Act. His
evidence on this point was rebutted by the acting administrator of
the appointing authority who testified that non-merit factors had
nothing to do with Snipas' furlough. The court, in rejecting the
75. Analysis of this case will be presented later in the article along with an explanation
as to why it is not a "true" disparate impact case.
76. 12 Pa. Commw. 400, 316 A.2d 676 (1974).
77. Id. at 401, 316 A.2d at 677 (emphasis added).
78. 46 Pa. Commw. 196, 405 A.2d 1366 (1979).
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discrimination claim, wrote that "[a]n individual alleging discrimination bears the burden of proving that non-merit factors motivated the personnel action. '79 The different results in Snipas and
Department of Revenue appear to be attributable to the difference
in detail offered by each employee to support his claim.
The motive factor also appears in Lynch v. Department of Public Welfare.8 0 In Lynch, the employee appealed her non-selection
for promotion alleging gender discrimination. The issue before the
court was whether the Commission committed legal error by its
refusal to hear testimony on the relative qualifications of Lynch
and the selectee. The court agreed that "a sex discrimination
charge can be sustained by proof of the subjective intent of the
alleged discriminator, and that one way to prove intent to discriminate . . .is to show that the appointing authority promoted the
less qualified applicant."8 1 Additionally, the court recognized that
discrimination cases "more often than not reston inferences drawn
from acts and the credibility of the explanations assertedly justifying them. '8 2 The court also wrote that in matters of promotion the
issue of discrimination is tied to the question of qualifications and
that when an employer chooses someone other than the most qualified candidate there is a strong inference that the selection was
motivated by a non-merit factor.8 3 While this statement is probably true in general, its strict application to the Civil Service Act
must be a cautious one because the Act does not specifically require that the most qualified candidate be appointed or promoted.
Reference to section 501,84 dealing with promotion, and section
602,85 dealing with the selection and appointment of eligibles, indicates that while the criteria for selection must be merit related
there is no requirement under section 602 that the individual with
the highest test scores be appointed, nor is there any requirement
under section 501 that the individual with the highest PER and
most seniority be promoted. In fact, the practice is to group all
79. Id. at 201, 405 A.2d at 1369. For this proposition the Snipas court cited Cunningham v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 17 Pa. Commw. 375, 332 A.2d 839 (1975). Reference to
Cunningham discloses that no such statement was made therein.
80. 30 Pa. Commw. 235, 373 A.2d 469 (1977).
81. Id. at 239-40, 373 A.2d at 471.
82. Id. at 240, 373 A.2d at 471 (quoting Mawn v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 17 Pa.
Commw. 9, 14, 330 A.2d 271, 274 (1975)), appealed again after remand sub. nom. Dep't of
Pub. Welfare v. Mawn, 28 Pa. Commw. 377, 368 A.2d 1316 (1977).
83. 30 Pa. Commw. at 240, 373 A.2d at 472.
84. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.501 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.602 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
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employees with PERs of "very good" or above together as tied and,
in addition, group them in five year blocks of seniority. Therefore,
the interviewing process can be used even when the employee has
the highest PER and the most seniority. Thus, to the extent that
"most qualified" is quantified only in terms of examinations or
PERs, the most qualified individual need not be appointed or promoted in order to comply with the substantive provisions of the
Civil Service Act dealing with appointment and promotion.
The Lynch court found support for its "most qualified" rationale
by relying upon General Electric, a disparate impact Pennsylvania
Human Relations Commission case. As explained earlier, in General Electric the court reasoned that the "best able and most competent to perform" clause of section 5 of the Human Relations Act
was analogous to the business necessity doctrine recognized by the
Supreme Court in Griggs, a disparate impact case. Application of
the General Electric best able doctrine to Lynch may be faulty
because, as previously noted, section 501 of the Civil Service Act
does not require that the most qualified candidate be selected for
promotion-only that a qualified candidate be promoted. In fact,
section 501 of the Civil Service Act is actually more akin to Title
VII as construed in Burdine86 than to section 5(a) of the Human
Relations Act. Burdine, a disparate treatment case, and hence
comparable to Lynch, held that under Title VII an employer need
not show that the selectee was more qualified than the non-selectee because Title VII permits an employer to choose from among
equally qualified candidates.8 7 It is suggested that in civil service
cases where the most qualified candidate (in quantitative terms) is
not chosen a presumption of discrimination should arise. To this
extent, Lynch is correct. However, a demonstration that the most
qualified candidate was not selected or promoted should not give
rise to a per se finding of discrimination under the Civil Service
Act and Lynch should not be read as requiring this. Strict application of the best able standard found in Lynch can, in addition, be
detrimental to the appealing non-selectee who bears the burden
under section 951(b) because it suggests that to sustain his burden
under section 951(b) that individual is required to show that he or
she was the most qualified candidate. 88
86. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
87. Id. at 259.
88. For other cases reciting the Lynch "most qualified" standard see Dep't of Transp.
v. Wible, 74 Pa. Commw. 620, 460 A.2d 903 (1983); Butler v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 57
Pa. Commw. 406, 426 A.2d 239 (1981).
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Subsequent to Lynch, in Quarles v. Department of Transportation,8 9 a provisional status employee appealed his removal. The
personnel action was premised upon Quarles having been charged
with and arrested for misdemeanor offenses of misappropriating
funds of an agency and violating the firearms laws.9 0 These facts
were printed in a newspaper article which mentioned that the employee was employed by the appointing authority.9 1 The employee,
maintaining that the charges did not reflect adversely on state government and were not related to his ability to do his job, contended that his removal was discriminatory. The court cited
Snipas for the proposition that the employee must show that a
non-merit factor motivated the action.92 The court wrote:
[K]eeping in mind that the [employee's] duties entailed extensive efforts to
try to bring minority contractors and employers into state highway construction projects, it is not inconceivable nor the result of strained logic imbued with discriminatory intent, to conclude that the charges lodged
against him, especially the one alleging misappropriation of public funds for
personal use, might suggest a breach of the public trust which would seriously reduce his job effectiveness while simultaneously diminishing public
respect and confidence in [the appointing authority] and in state
government. 3

Thus Quarles reiterates, in language stronger than Snipas, the intent requirement.
Despite the appellate court's repeated indications that discriminatory intent or motive must be established in cases which, although not specifically so called, are in fact disparate treatment
94
situations, one case, Snyder v. Department of Transportation,
has taken a different approach. The employee in Snyder appealed
the failure of his appointing authority to promote him to a vacancy
in a higher job classification. The position was instead filled by allowing a higher level employee to take a voluntary demotion. It is
clear that the appeal was under section 951(b). With respect to the
employee's burden, the court wrote, "[Aln employee alleging that
he was the victim of unlawful discrimination in a personnel action
has the burden of establishing . . . discriminatory conduct."95 The
89.
90.
91.

61 Pa. Commw. 572, 434 A.2d 864 (1981).
Id. at 573, 434 A.2d at 864.
Id.

92.

Quarles, 61 Pa. Commw. at 575, 434 A.2d at 865.

93.
94.
95.

Id. at 575-76, 434 A.2d at 865 (emphasis added).
64 Pa. Commw. 599, 441 A.2d 494 (1982).
Id. at 602, 441 A.2d at 495 (emphasis added).
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court cited O'Peil v. State Civil Service Commission" in support
of this proposition. O'Peil, however, involved a challenge to a uniformly applied compensation plan which did not provide for a salary increment.9 7 Because O'Peil involved a neutral policy, it is perhaps closer to a disparate impact than a disparate treatment case.
It therefore appears that the Snyder court's reliance upon O'Peil
may be inappropriate.
Finally, there is one case which deals, by implication only, with
the question of motive and is difficult to classify. In Dadey v. Bureau of Employment Security,9 8 the employee brought an action
alleging that the appointing authority's promotion of another and
its failure to appoint him violated section 501 of the Civil Service
Act. Dadey's theory was that section 501 had been violated because
the selectee had not, prior to her promotion, occupied the next
lower position to her promoted position and hence did not meet
the criteria of section 501.11 Although Dadey failed to meet his
burden, the nuance is that had he shown that the selectee had not
occupied the next lower position he would have sustained his burden. Significantly, nothing in Dadey suggests that intent to discriminate need be shown or that part of Dadey's failure was his
inability to prove intent. Thus, it is possible to read Dadey as suggesting that where a technical violation of the Civil Service Act is
proved by the employee, the employee need not demonstrate that
the violation was intentional to sustain his burden. 0 0° This position, it is submitted, is desirable because it allows aggrieved employees to aid in enforcing compliance with the technical provisions of the Civil Service Act. To deny recovery in the face of a
clear statutory violation because such violation does not itself in96. 16 Pa. Commw. 467, 332 A.2d 879 (1975). O'Peil in turn cited Hunter v. Jones, 417
Pa. 372, 207 A.2d 784 (1965), aff'd after hearing sub. nom. Hunter v. Pa. State Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 422 Pa. 158, 220 A.2d 879 (1966). Reference to Hunter discloses that no such
statement was made therein.
97. 16 Pa. Commw. at 471, 332 A.2d at 881-82. This compensation plan was held in
O'Peil not to constitute a personnel action under section 905.1.
98. 70 Pa. Commw. 513, 453 A.2d 702 (1982).
99. Id. at 516, 453 A.2d 704. Section 501 permits promotion without examination if the
person has completed a probationary period in the next lower position, meets the minimum
requirements for the higher position and receives the unqualified recommendation of his or
her supervisor. It is the first criterion which Dadey maintained that the selectee had not
met.
100. Dadey is a case which is perhaps properly considered under the section of this
article entitled "The Procedural Discrimination Problem." But see note 108.
It should be noted that the cases cited in the text are merely selected examples of where
the question of motive has been considered. Cases mentioning the motive requirement are
legion.
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dicate an intent to discriminate against the appealing employee is
to exalt form over substance and ignore the fundamental principle
of civil service law that merit should prevail.
VII.

DISPARATE IMPACT UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE ACT

There has been no specific recognition of disparate impact as a
discriminatory theory embodied within section 905.1. The opportunity for case law to develop in this area is scant because neutral
policies which are adopted by the Commonwealth agencies or by
the Civil Service Commission can be challenged via the Human
Relations Act and Title VII and because the Civil Service Act does
not specifically recognize class actions. Thus if, for example, potential employees viewed standardized civil service tests as having a
discriminatory impact, the action could be appropriately filed with
the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. There is, however, one case
which contains what was arguably a neutral policy affecting a
group of persons °1 and is somewhat akin to disparate impact
cases.
In Board of Probation and Parole v. Baker 02 (Baker 1), the appointing authority conducted unauthorized testing in violation of
101. The writer has used the term "arguably neutral" because, while the policy may
have been applied uniformly to all employees, the policy itself constituted a violation of the
Civil Service Act.
102. 51 Pa. Commw. 501, 414 A.2d 1117 (1980) (Baker I), appealed again sub. nor.
Alterman v. Baker, 71 Pa. Commw. 124, 454 A.2d 1154 (1983) (Baker II), appealed again
sub. nom. Pa. Board of Probation and Parole v. Baker, 82 Pa. Commw. 86, 474 A.2d 415
(1984) (Baker III).
Baker I involved a promotion without examination process. Such procedure has strict
guidelines. See note 99. Nonetheless, the appointing authority administered to all the candidates its own written examination. Each Board member graded each applicant; there was no
consultation among Board members with respect to the grading and no standard against
which to measure the answers. The only consideration in making the selection was the score
on this written examination.
Baker II is procedurally complex, but in essence involved the Board's attempt to transfer
its original selectee (who had never been validly promoted). The Commonwealth Court indicated that because the promotion was improper the selectee could not remain in the transferred position. The case also includes a demotion and immediate repromotion process
which both the Civil Service Commission and the Commonwealth Court found improper.
Baker III involved the question of whether the Civil Service Commission was empowered
to award attorneys fees under section 951(b). Although the Commonwealth Court determined it was not, the court acknowledged that after the Civil Service Commission had entered its award the General Assembly changed the law to allow Commonwealth agencies to
award counsel fees in certain situations. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §§ 2031 - 2035 (Purdon
Supp. 1986). The applicability of this new law to the Civil Service Commission has yet to be
determined.
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section 501 of the Act. Baker I was a non-selection case and hence
was heard under section 951(b). In Baker I,the appointing authority argued that since it applied improper procedures to all candidates it could not be said to have discriminated against Baker. 0 3
The court rejected this argument. 1 4 Baker I seems to suggest that
a clear violation of the Civil Service Act is discriminatory per se.
The implied holding in Baker I becomes clearer in Baker I,105
wherein the court referred to the "discrimination we previously
found present in the board's promotion process."' ' The argument
in Baker I that the procedure was uniformly applied is suggestive
of a disparate impact situation, but the fact that this policy was,
on its face, violative of section 501 indicates that it was not "neutral" in all respects and thus that Baker I was not a true disparate
impact case.
VIII.

THE PROCEDURAL DISCRIMINATION PROBLEM

This is an area of civil service law which has evolved because of
the fact that many personnel actions can be appealed only under
section 951(b). It apparently has its beginnings in the Commission's older version of its Appeal Request Form.1 07 Both the prior
forms and the current form provide numerous boxes which an employee claiming discrimination can check off in order to assert the
type of discrimination that he or she is alleging. Most of the selections are typical choices such as race, religion, sex and union affiliation. But included among the choices in the prior forms was "illegal procedure." This term is nowhere defined. An employee could
check this category in addition to alleging more traditional forms
of discrimination, but often the reason for the employee's appeal
was not his belief that he was a victim of one of the traditional
forms of discrimination, but rather that he was a victim of the incorrect application of a technical process utilized to implement the
103. 51 Pa. Commw. at 503, 414 A.2d at 1118.
104. Id.
105. See note 102.
106. 71 Pa. Commw. at 131, 454 A.2d at 1158.
107, See Appendix A. This form, it should be noted, provides for appeals under section 951(b) on the basis of "illegal procedure by agency." The form pre-dating it did so as
well. Although the current form, see Appendix B, does not provide a block to be checked for
this type of discrimination, the Chief Counsel for the State Civil Service Commission has
stated that the specific absence of procedural discrimination from the new form is not an
indication that the Commission has retracted its position that procedural discrimination is
actionable under section 905.1. Interview with Barbara G. Raup, Esquire, July 8, 1986.
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personnel action.'0 8
One simple example of how procedural discrimination can occur
is the totalling of PERs. Order of furlough and selection for promotion are often dictated at least in part by an employee's past
performance on the job.' 09 Performance is calculated by totalling
the individual grades on an employee's PER(s) and comparing his
or her score with that of other similarly situated" 0 employees. In
carrying out this procedure, an appointing authority may add the
numbers incorrectly or mistakenly use the wrong employee's PER
or the report from the wrong year. Clearly an inequity has occurred. The inequity, however, is not based on race, union affiliation or other similar factors. it is based on a technical mistake. But
in many instances the aggrieved employee can, because of his status or because of the type of personnel action, appeal only on the
basis of discrimination; hence, procedural discrimination is his
theory.
The major problems with procedural discrimination are first,
that it is not "discrimination" in a commonly accepted form,"'
and second, that because what happened is only a mistake, intent
cannot be shown. Case law in this area is chaotic because of the
appellate court's failure to recognize the genesis of this theory of
"discrimination." Examination of two procedural discrimination
cases will serve to demonstrate the confusion. In Insurance Department v. Tracz," 2 the employee appealed his furlough under
section 951(a), maintaining that section 802 of the Act was violated
because two other employees who, like Tracz, held Administrative
Officer I positions, were not included in Tracz's class for furlough
purposes. The employee appealed also under section 951(b), maintaining that the procedure of not grouping the three employees together was discriminatory. The Commission sustained Tracz's appeal on both bases. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court affirmed
108. Both the Dadey case and Baker H are examples of cases where the allegations
pertained to the misapplication of the technical requirements in section 501. They have not
been grouped with cases dealing with procedural discrimination for the purposes of this
article because the Commonwealth Court did not specifically view them as such. In Dadey,
no technical error was proven, but in Baker I the procedural violation was admitted.
109. See section 802 and section 501 of the Civil Service Act. See also note 11.
110. What constitutes "similarly situated" will be dictated by the particular personnel
action. For example, under section 802, to determine order of furlough, comparison of PERs
would properly be limited to comparison within a furlough unit.
111. Procedural discrimination does not fit within the province of disparate treatment
cases since there is no intent to discriminate. It is not an example of disparate impact because it does not involve application of a neutral policy.
112. 77 Pa. Commw. 502, 466 A.2d 269 (1983).
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the Commission order "but only insofar as the order is based on
section 802 of the Civil Service Act."" 3 With respect to the discrimination issue the court wrote that "there is insubstantial evidence on the record to support the Commission's conclusion that
the Department [of Insurance] discriminated against Tracz. Although the Department committed a procedural error with regard
to Tracz, such an error is not necessarily the equivalent of
discrimination. "114
The statement in Tracz that an improper procedure is not the
equivalent of discrimination suggests that something more need be
shown. The question which remains unanswered is, what if Tracz
had been a probationary employee who had a right of appeal only
under section 951(b)? Would the demonstration of procedural impropriety have sustained his burden?" 5 If not, then the aggrieved
employee has no remedy whatsoever. 1 6 The unfortunate aspect of
Tracz is that it could have been decided by the Commission solely
1 17
on the section 951 (a) claim.
113. Id. at 509, 466 A.2d at 273. It is interesting to note that while the Commission
sustained Tracz's appeal under both section 802 and section 905.1, the Civil Service Commission's adjudication contains no discussion whatsoever of the section 905.1 violation.
114. Id. at 508-09, 466 A.2d at 273 (citing Silverman v. Dep't of Educ., 70 Pa.Commw.
444, 454 A.2d 185 (1982)). The alleged procedural error in Silverman was the appointing
authority's delay in exposing Silverman to furlough. The Commonwealth Court indicated
that to sustain his burden under section 951(b) Silverman would have had to have shown
that the appointing authority was "improperly motivated in its personnel action .. " Id.
at 455, 454 A.2d at 190. The court rejected the Commission's approach which had been that
because the appointing authority had followed improper procedures it was automatically
guilty of discrimination. Id. at 455, 454 A.2d at 190. Silverman cannot be reconciled with
the Baker cases which indicated that improper procedure constituted discrimination per se.
The Silverman case is viewed by many civil service practitioners as the worst case ever
decided under the Civil Service Act. Not only did it fail to grasp the concept of procedural
discrimination, it also established new and incomprehensible law in the area of lack of work
furlough, and rejected the Commission's application of the admittedly equitable concept of
de facto demotion.
115. Tracz is an interesting case because, although the discrimination claim was not
upheld on appeal, Tracz retained his full remedy because of the court's affirmance of the
finding of a violation of section 802. Tracz's remedy before the Commission consisted of an
order requiring the appointing authority to recompute the furlough rankings of all employees in Tracz's class. If after doing so it was determined that Tracz should not have been
furloughed he was to be reinstated with full back pay.
116. Indeed, Silverman appears to stand as evidence of this harsh consequence. See
note 114.
117. It must be understood that Tracz was a regular status employee challenging a
furlough. The appointing authority bore the burden of establishing a lack of work or a lack
of funds justifying the furlough under the section 951(a) claim. It was also responsible for
demonstrating that it furloughed employees in the proper order considering their seniority
and PERs. If it failed in this burden, and the Commission found that it did, then section
802 of the Act was violated. Consequently, it was unnecessary for the Commission to even
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Williams v. Department of Transportation"8 (Williams I),
which was decided shortly after Tracz, suggests that merely demonstrating a procedural impropriety does establish discrimination.
In a prior appeal of the same case, Williams v. Department of
Transportation (Williams I),"" the Commonwealth Court held
that the use of non-uniform PERs for purposes of determining
which employees within a class were to be furloughed was discriminatory. The Williams I court remanded the case to the Commission for further hearing because the Commission had improperly
precluded the employee from presenting evidence that the PERs
used in his furlough were defective. The Commission on remand
heard the case under both section 951(a) and section 951(b). It determined that non-uniform factors had been considered, but nonetheless upheld the furlough action after determining that Williams
still would have been furloughed even if only uniform factors had
been considered. Commonwealth Court, in Williams H, reversed
stating that there is no requirement that the employee show that
the improper computation was actually prejudicial. 2 '
Williams H and Tracz upon close analysis appear irreconcilable.
The Tracz court affirmed the section 802 claim only, and on the
discrimination issue, determined that a procedural error alone is
not necessarily discrimination. Williams H, if read as a discrimination case, 2 ' says that where a procedural error is shown discrimination exists per se.
reach the discrimination issue.
118. 79 Pa. Commw. 113, 468 A.2d 547 (1983).
119. 64 Pa. Commw. 153, 439 A.2d 233 (1982).
120. 79 Pa. Commw. at 116, 468 A.2d at 548. The Williams II case approved the Commission adjudication in the Appeal of Weikel (No. 2786, filed April 13, 1980). In Weikel the
Commission indicated in its discussion that the practice of comparing PERs with the nonuniform factors was discriminatory but it did not conclude as a matter of law that section
905.1 had been violated. Instead, its conclusion of law was limited only to a finding of a
violation of section 802. Additionally, the Commission did not specifically find that Weikel
was prejudiced by the practice of comparing non-uniform PERs. In its Williams I adjudication, in distinguishing Weikel, the Commission wrote, "In Weikel, this Commission had
no evidence that Weikel would have been designated for . . . furlough had the calculation
been redone properly." (Appeal of Williams, No. 2787 filed April 9, 1984). By relying upon
the reasoning in Weikel, the Williams II court seems to be saying that the comparison of
non-uniform factors is discriminatory, but it does not clearly hold that its determination is
based on a section 951(b) claim. Because Williams II, like Tracz, involved a case brought
under both section 951(a) and section 951(b) the case can be read to mean merely that the
procedures followed were in violation of section 802 and hence that the appointing authority
failed in its burden. Under this reading, Williams I is not a discrimination case. This writer
believes, however, that the case is a section 951(b) case.
121. See supra note 120.
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The difficulty with the Tracz rationale is that, practically speaking, one can never establish intent to discriminate in cases when
what is at issue is a technical error. Williams II, in rejecting the
notion that intent need be shown, appears to be the better analysis
but it goes to the extreme by implying that there is no such thing
as harmless error. It is suggested that the better reasoning would
be that because intent is not an element in many of these procedural discrimination cases, a miscalculation which is harmless in
effect should not be considered discriminatory as a matter of law.
Nothing is gained by so holding. Accordingly, it is submitted that
the following three prong approach would establish an effective
guideline for the appellate courts to use in evaluating cases alleging
procedural discrimination:
1. Is the action truly appealable only under section 951(b)?
2. Is the allegation in the nature of procedural discrimination?
3. Has actual harm been shown?
The first prong would allow cases in which the allegation relates
to improper procedures being followed under section 802 to be
treated as section 951 (a) claims in the case of regular status employees. If the appointing authority cannot show that it properly
computed the order of furlough then the furlough action is invalid
under section 802 and the discrimination issue need not even be
reached. 122 While this would not work in cases where probationary
employees appeal, such instances are rare.
The second question to be considered is actually an extension of
the first, but it also forces the segregation of true disparate treatment cases from procedural discrimination cases.
The last question avoids the Williams II result by adopting a
"no-harm no-foul" approach. To direct the appointing authority to
reinstate, award back pay and refurlough because of a harmless
miscalculation is nothing more than bureaucratic wastefulness at
12 3
the taxpayer's expense.
122. This approach would avoid the situation which occurred in Tracz and may have
occurred in Williams I.
123. One other case demonstrating the problems related to the restricted right of appeal of probationary employees alleging procedural discrimination deserves mention. In
County of Beaver v. Funk, 89 Pa. Commw. 226, 492 A.2d 118 (1985), an interesting case
involving a violation of the Civil Service Act which was not technically a misapplied procedure, the Commonwealth Court suggested that where the appointing authority was unable
to demonstrate lack of funds such as to justify a furlough under section 3(s), the furlough
was improper and therefore discriminatory. Although subtly done, this case, which involved
the appeal of a probationary employee, places the burden of proof on the appointing
authority.
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THE "MISTAKE OF FACT" DISCRIMINATION PROBLEM

Akin to procedural discrimination is discrimination based upon
mistake of fact. It evolved for the same reason as did procedural
discrimination. A recent Commonwealth Court case dealing with
this issue is State CorrectionalInstitution at Graterford v. Goodridge. 24 Goodridge simply does away with the motive requirement.
Goodridge was employed as a corrections officer trainee, probationary status. Graterford State Correctional Institution dismissed
him on the grounds that he had falsified his employment application, a violation of section 902 of the Act.1 25 The Commission determined that no falsification had occurred. On appeal to Commonwealth Court, Graterford did not question the Commission's
findings. Instead, it argued that "because its functionaries sincerely believed, based on the information they had received, that
[Goodridge] had lied on his application, their action dismissing
him was not a personnel action based on non-merit factors because
it was taken for reasons related to merit. ' 12 The Commonwealth
Court agreed that the charge of falsification was job-related, 27 but
wrote, "[W]e are concerned not with the charges. We are concerned with their basis in fact, which [Goodridge] has been given
the right to test by appeal to the State Civil Service Commission."' 128 The Goodridge court further stated that because the
Commission properly found that there was no factual basis to supThis misapplied burden occurred because in County of Beaver the Commission consolidated the appeals of two furloughees, one a regular status employee, the other a probationer. The appointing authority had the burden to establish a lack of funds only with respect to the regular status employee. It failed to meet its burden. The probationary
employee, who bore the burden of establishing that the furlough action was discriminatory,
presented testimony that the furlough was in retaliation for her bargaining unit's refusal to
accept a wage freeze. But the finding of discrimination was not based upon this testimony.
Instead, the court permitted the Commission to bootstrap by relying upon the lack of evidence produced during the portion of the hearing pertaining to the regular status employee,
which evidence was insufficient to show a valid lack of funds. Thus Funk, in effect, allowed
a probationer to prove her discrimination claim by relying upon the appointing authority's
failure to meet its burden in the section 951(a) appeal of the regular status employee. While
Funk did not involve a true "procedural error," it is an example of technical non-compliance
which must be deemed discrimination to permit appeal and rectify a "wrong." As the Commission stated in Appeal of Graeser, the companion case to Funk, "Actions taken by an
appointing authority in a manner contrary to the requirements of the Civil Service Act are,
per se, violations of the Act's prohibition against discrimination." Appeal of Graeser (No.
4384, filed Sept. 16, 1983).
124. 87 Pa. Commw. 527, 487 A.2d 1036 (1985).
125. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.902 (Purdon 1962).
126. 87 Pa. Commw. at 530-31, 487 A.2d at 1038.
127. Id. at 531, 487 A.2d at 1038.
128. Id.
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port the charge, the removal was for non-merit reasons. 2 ' The
court reasoned that to hold that charges which were found to be
untrue must be upheld would render the right of appeal a nullity. 130 Most significantly, the Goodridge court stated that
Graterford's thesis "rests on the proposition that in order to establish an act of discrimination the victim must show that the [appointing authority] intended to discriminate. The law is clearly to
the contrary."1 3' 1 As support for this proposition the court cited
Canon-McMillan School District v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission ex rel Davis.13 2 Canon-McMillan is a Pennsylvania Human Relations Act case which relied upon General Electric
and hence a Title VII analysis. More importantly, Canon clearly
involved a facially neutral policy applied by the employer to all
employees and hence was a disparate impact case. Goodridge, however, did not involve such a policy, but rather rested upon the action taken by Graterford based upon allegations peculiar only to
Goodridge. Thus, reliance upon disparate impact case law is incorrect. However, because, as is often the case in procedural discrimination cases, intent in mistake of fact discrimination cases is also
frequently nonexistent, the result in Goodridge appears correct. It
is the analysis that presents the problem. It is suggested that had
the court understood the genesis of mistake of fact discrimination
and the lack of intent which normally occurs in such cases, it could
have reached the right result but without resort to a disparate im1 33
pact theory.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 531-32, 487 A.2d at 1038-39.
132. 30 Pa. Commw. 1, 372 A.2d 498 (1977).
133. The holding in Goodridge and this writer's suggestion that intent should not be a
requirement in procedural and mistake of fact cases presents interesting problems. For example, if intent need not be shown then the appointing authority will never have a good
faith defense. This result is not without its problems as the following hypothetical illustrates. The appointing authority has a progressive disciplinary scheme for chronic lateness
which calls for an oral warning on the first offense, followed by, for each successive offense, a
written warning, a one day suspension, a three day suspension and removal. Suppose the
probationary employee is late for the fourth time; discipline should be the three day suspension. But because of a clerical mistake the appointing authority believes this is the fifth
infraction and removes her. She appeals. At the hearing it is discovered that this was her
fourth infraction, and she should have received only a three day suspension. Yet, it is not
disputed that the error was clerical in nature and that the highest level supervisor who
actually implemented the personnel action (for example the Administrator of a state hospital) had no idea what her disciplinary record was but was merely presuming that the recommendation for removal sent up the chain of command was factually accurate.
Since under Goodridge no intent to discriminate need be shown, and since the effect was
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THE PROBLEM OF INFERENCE

Although under Title VII and Burdine an employee can establish intent indirectly by showing that an employer's explanation is
incredible, State Civil Service case law is somewhat misleading on
the question of whether intent can be inferred. Clearly Lynch permits such inference, but other cases restrict it.
In Skowronski v. Governor's Council on Drug and Alcohol
Abuse,13 a provisional employee appealed her demotion. The employee maintained that the Commission should have inferred discrimination based upon the fact that she had received a "very
good" PER approximately six weeks prior to her demotion. 1 35 The
court held that the Commission had not erred in failing to infer
discrimination. In addition, the PER itself supported testimony
that the employee had difficulty communicating with people. 13 6 In
such an instance, the refusal to allow the inference appears correct.
In a later case, Tempero v. Department of Environmental Resources,137 employees appealed their reassignments, alleging that
they were discriminated against. Unfortunately the facts are not
elaborated upon in the opinion. But the employees apparently argued that because they had good performance ratings their reassignments must have been discriminatory. The Tempero court
maintained that "[d]iscrimination cannot be inferred merely because of the existence of good performance ratings."'' 38 What distinguishes Tempero from Skowronski is that the former deals with
the employee's prima facie burden, whereas the latter pertains to
the appointing authority's rebuttal evidence.
to discriminate against the employee by not properly following the progressive disciplinary
route, it would appear that discrimination has been established. The Commission orders
reinstatement with full back pay. On the average, the order will appear about six to eight
months after the removal and the Commonwealth and the taxpaying public must pay six to
eight months wages for no work. There are other concerns. The highest level supervisor can
combat this result only by personally checking every fact since he or she has no good faith
defense. Most significantly, however, the payment of wages by the appointing authority will
not serve to deter future discriminatory acts when there was no intent to discriminate in the
first
place.
Despite these problems, to argue that intent must be shown in cases involving procedural
or factual discrimination is also fraught with difficulties. In the hypothetical, while the
agency was at most negligent, the employee was completely blameless for the error. To deny
her reinstatement and back pay appears inequitable. In addition, to require a showing of
intent is an impossible burden since there was never intent-only mistake.
134. 28 Pa. Commw. 236, 368 A.2d 852 (1977).
135. Id. at 239, 368 A.2d at 854.
136. Id.
137. 44 Pa. Commw. 235, 403 A.2d 226 (1979).
138. Id. at 238, 403 A.2d at 229.
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The Commonwealth Court has also rejected the notion that a
significant difference between earlier ratings given by one supervisor and a later less favorable rating given by a new supervisor justifies an inference of discrimination.'3 9 Similarly, where a furloughed employee asserted that PERs were artifically inflated as a
result of a supervisor's desire to retain certain employees, the court
disallowed an inference of discrimination. " " In general, it appears
as though the Commonwealth Court is unwilling to permit an inference of discrimination when there is an absence of any negative
evidence implicating the appointing authority. Thus an employee's
theory, such as that PERs are artifically inflated, will not operate
to shift the burden unless that theory is accompanied by some
solid evidence.
XI. WHAT CONSTITUTES DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE

ACT?
In disparate treatment cases, the employee's general theory of
the case frequently takes one of two forms. In what can be called
the "comparison approach," an employee presents evidence to
compare his situation and treatment with that of other employees.
In so doing, certain evidence is critical. The employee must establish his status (probationary, provisional, regular), his job title and
his job duties. He must then present evidence wherein his treatment is compared with others similarly situated. Thus, the testimony should include the status, job title and duties of the other
employees. This comparison approach has been approved by the
14
Commonwealth Court. 1

139. Sauers v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 76 Pa. Commw. 504, 464 A.2d 635 (1983).
140. Sebastiani v. Dep't of Transp., 75 Pa. Commw. 602, 462 A.2d 942 (1983).
"[Dliscrimination by the appointing authority against the employee cannot be inferred by
the Commission since there must be some affirmative support adduced to sustain the allegations of discrimination." Id. at 605, 462 A.2d at 944 (citing Delaware County Bd. of Assistance v. Balanow, 63 Pa. Commw. 388, 437 A.2d 1312 (1981)). In Balanow, the court stated
generally that discrimination cannot be inferred, but also noted that no evidence of discrimination whatsoever had been produced. See also Wagner v. Dep't of Transp., 76 Pa.
Commw. 78, 83, 463 A.2d 492, 495 (1983) (held that "discrimination ...cannot be inferred
... since there must be some affirmative support presented to sustain the allegations of
discrimination.")
141. In Scasserra v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 4 Pa. Commw. 283, 287 A.2d 158 (1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 968 (1973), the employee, a caseworker trainee, probationary status, alleged
that his removal was based upon his prior criminal record, reports in local newspapers concerning his employment by the appointing authority and concurrent receipt of welfare payments, and failure to supply a doctor's excuse for an authorized absence which he asserted
he supplied. The State Civil Service Commission, in dismissing the appeal, wrote, "[We
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The other method sometimes employed in asserting a discrimination claim can be termed the "retaliatory approach." In these
cases, the employee is not directly concerned with comparing his
situation to that of others, but instead asserts that the personnel
action was taken to retaliate against the employee for some action
he has taken. Often such cases involve union activities by the employees." 2 Another pattern in retaliatory approach cases occurs
where a subordinate employee disagrees with a supervisor over
143
work related matters.

find] that the appointing authority treated appellant in the same manner as they would
have treated any other employee in similar circumstances.
...
Id. at 287, 287 A.2d at 161.
The Scasserra court quoted this language and apparently approved it. Similarly, in Philadelphia County Bd. of Assistance v. Cahan, 24 Pa. Commw. 543, 358 A.2d 440 (1976), where
an income maintenance worker trainee, probationary status, appealed her demotion to clerk
II, the court specifically cited with approval to evidence of Cahan's supervisor being asked if
she had treated Cahan differently from any other income maintenance worker trainee. 24
Pa. Commw. at 548, 358 A.2d at 442. And in Snyder v. Dep't of Transp., 64 Pa. Commw.
599, 441 A.2d 494 (1982), where the employee appealed his denial of promotion and sought
to prove his case "through the introduction of circumstantial evidence aimed at demonstrating that other, less qualified employees . . .received promotions at the time his requested
promotion was denied," the court agreed with the Commission that "[tihe circumstances
surrounding the promotions of the other employees differed from those present in. . . [Snyder's] situation." Id. at 602, 441 A.2d at 495. Finally, in Norristown State Hosp. v. Bruce, 69
Pa. Commw. 298, 450 A.2d 1093 (1982), where a psychiatric aide I, probationary status,
appealed his removal, which had been based on a charge of failing to disclose fully his criminal conviction record on his employment application, the court, in considering whether
Bruce met his burden, explained, "At no point in the proceedings before the Commission,
however, was there any evidence submitted indicating that Mr. Bruce had been treated any
differently than other employees with similar criminal records." Id. at 302, 450 A.2d at 1095.
142. In Mawn v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 17 Pa. Commw. 9, 330 A.2d 271 (1975), the
employee unsuccessfully attempted to show that his union activities were the basis of his
being denied a promotion. An example of a slightly different factual situation is Wagner v.
Dep't of Transp., 76 Pa. Commw. 78, 463 A.2d 492 (1983), which involved the employee's
allegation that he was suspended as a result of union complaints because of his having previously disciplined union members.
143. In Sauers v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 76 Pa. Commw. 504, 464 A.2d 635 (1983),
where the employee wrote a memorandum which was critical of his supervisor's management decisions, and also exhibited his low regard for the supervisor's abilities by "inveighing
against, complaining of, and failing to support" the superior's decisions, the Commission
found no discrimination in the issuance by the superior of a somewhat critical PER. Id. at
507, 464 A.2d at 637.
Other factors which the court has also cited as evidence not tending to establish discrimination or as rebutting a charge of discrimination include: a supervisor being the same race
as the employee alleging racial discrimination as in Smith v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Bd., 28 Pa. Commw. 336, 368 A.2d 923 (1977); performance evaluation reports which are
remote in time as in Boris v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 81 Pa. Commw. 547, 474 A.2d 722
(1984); Gibson v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 35 Pa. Commw. 27, 384 A.2d 1030 (1978); performance evaluation reports with high marks in the pre-printed categories, but negative comments as in Dep't of Health v. Graham, 58 Pa. Commw. 409, 427 A.2d 1279 (1981); a decrease in performance evaluation report ratings under a new supervisor as in Sauers v. Dep't
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Assuming that a prima facie case of disparate treatment is established, under a Title VII analysis, the burden would then shift to
the appointing authority to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its action. It is submitted that in a civil service
case, as in any employment discrimination case, the best way to
rebut the prima facie case is to show that the action was taken for
job related reasons. Although in Cunningham v. State Civil Service Commission, 4 ' the Commonwealth Court wrote that "[i]f the
probationary status employee fails to sustain his charge of discrimination, his dismissal stands without consideration of the validity
of the determination of unsatisfactory work performance"1 45 it
would appear that "sustain his charge" should be read to mean
establish a prima facie case because once the prima facie case is
made out, establishing a legitimate reason for the action necessarily involves examining its propriety. 4 6
of Pub. Welfare, 76 Pa. Commw. 504, 464 A.2d 635 (1983); and the presence of a recent
favorable PER followed six weeks later by a costly funding error and then a demotion as in
Skowronski v. Governor's Council on Drug and Alcohol Abuse, 28 Pa. Commw. 236, 368
A.2d 852 (1977). In addition, a policy of mandatory retirement at age 65 is not discriminatory. Delaware County Child Care Services v. Goodley, 53 Pa. Commw. 333, 417 A.2d 868
(1980). For further discussion of Goodley see note 171.
144. 17 Pa. Commw. 375, 332 A.2d 839 (1975).
145. Id. at 378, 332 A.2d at 840-41.
146. Cases containing factual examples of effective rebuttal are legion. In Bureau of
Corrections v. Yancey, 85 Pa. Commw. 143, 481 A.2d 702 (1984), a case involving a corrections officer trainee, probationary status, the Commonwealth Court held that a removal was
based on merit factors, where the employee, because of his prior criminal record, was unable
to carry a gun even though the carrying of a gun would be required in only limited instances. Effective rebuttal was also present in Smith v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 28
Pa. Commw. 336, 368 A.2d 923 (1977), where a liquor store clerk, probationary status, failed
to sustain his burden in light of the appointing authority's testimony that Smith, inter alia,
disrupted training sessions, objected to regulations prohibiting outside employment, and
was prone to outbursts and exhibitions of anger in a position involving daily dealings with
the general public. Another case demonstrating effective rebuttal is Litner v. Office of
Budget and Admin., 79 Pa. Commw. 176, 468 A.2d 903 (1983). In Litner, the employee, who
alleged discrimination based upon a work related respiratory problem, had her case rebutted
by evidence of her use of a WATS line in violation of office policy, her need for a greater
amount of supervision than was customary to one in her position, and her failure to complete assignments on time. And, in Philadelphia County Bd. of Assistance v. Vinson, 75 Pa.
Commw. 518, 463 A.2d 73 (1983), the appointing authority, after having its request to remove Vinson's name from the eligibility list because of convictions for robbery and conspiracy rejected, hired him as an income maintenance worker I. Upon receiving further legal
advice, it determined it could remove him and did so. Vinson alleged discrimination based
on a non-merit factor, his criminal record; the Commission agreed. Commonwealth Court
reversed noting that the job involved determining financial eligibility for welfare, visits to
current or potential recipients' homes, and access to negotiable instruments. Further testimony established that fifteen income maintenance workers had been convicted of defrauding the Commonwealth. In Meiler v. Dep't of Banking, 58 Pa. Commw. 346, 427 A.2d
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In some instances, a general denial of discriminatory intent may
be sufficient rebuttal, but such tactic is risky and may invite a later
action for malpractice. Because the entire civil service system is
premised upon the merit concept, effective rebuttal should include
an explanation of how the personnel action related to the job.
783 (1981), the employee, a bank examiner II, sought promotion to bank examiner III. He
alleged that he had greater seniority than the two selectees, had completed a training program not completed by one of the two selectees, had investigated a number of banks, and
was actually doing the work of a bank examiner III. Rebuttal evidence accepted as sufficient
included the fact that the training program as well as the actual experience heading investigations were only guidelines, the fact that one selectee who lacked this training had, instead,
an area of specialization in trust departments, the fact that Meiler had examined only a few
large banks, and the fact that he had extensively used leave time. One interesting point is
that while Meiler did not sustain his burden, he did present sufficient evidence of not having been assigned to investigate larger banks so as to cause the Commission to direct the
appointing authority to provide Meiler and the Commission with an explanatory statement
in the event he was passed over for future promotions.
It has also been established that allegations of discrimination based on age can be rebutted in a furlough case by showing that the appointing authority had in its employ older
workers. Angel v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 9 Pa. Commw. 582, 309 A.2d 69 (1973). And, in
Lusane v. Pennsylvania Civil Serv. Comm'n, 5 Pa. Commw. 642, 291 A.2d 808 (1972), a child
care aide who had been arrested on charges of assault and battery, wantonly pointing a
deadly weapon, and assault with intent to maim in an accident occurring outside the scope
of his employment was removed. Both the Commission and the Commonwealth Court rejected the notion that such factors were non-merit. The court noted that the job involved
care of mentally ill children and indicated that the activities (some of which the employee
had admitted to his supervisor) had led the appointing authority to conclude that Lusane's
temperment clouded his competency. Thus, a showing of off-the-job conduct, when linked
with the job itself, can rebut allegations of discrimination. Another case which submitted
effective rebuttal is Quarles v. Dep't of Transp., 61 Pa. Commw. 572, 434 A.2d 864 (1981). In
Quarles, an equal opportunities development specialist II was removed after being charged
with misdemeanor offenses of misappropriating public agency funds and violating firearms
laws. His discrimination claim was rebutted by testimony that the adverse publicity hampered his effectiveness on the job. And in Laws v. Philadelphia County Bd. of Assistance, 50
Pa. Commw. 340, 412 A.2d 1377 (1980), an employee suspended and then removed because
arthritis made her unable to perform "field work," such as visiting homes of welfare recipients to verify eligibility, appealed alleging discrimination based upon physical disability.
She argued that field work was only a minor part of her duties and hence her condition did
not substantially preclude her from doing her job. She also argued that reasonable accommodation should be made pursuant to 16 PA. CODE § 44.4 (Shepard's 1986). The Commission rejected Law's assertions finding that field work was a requirement of the position (the
appointing authority had offered her a demotion to a job not involving field work, and she
had been offered disability retirement). Determining that inability to exert a job duty is a
merit criterion, the court upheld the removal. One final example of effective rebuttal appears in Lowe v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 76 Pa. Commw. 267, 463 A.2d 1229 (1983),
wherein the employee, a clothing room attendant, appealed his removal which had been
premised upon his falsifying his civil service application by failing to reveal four of his five
criminal convictions. Relation to the job of the convictions (which included disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, shoplifting, assault and battery on a police officer, and robbery) was
established by testimony that the position involved patient contact and access to patient
property as well as to hospital equipment and supplies.
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CONCURRENT JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS

Section 12(b) of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act provides in pertinent part:
(b) Except

as provided in subsection (c), nothing contained in this act shall
be deemed to repeal or supersede any of the provisions of any existing...
law of this Commonwealth relating to discrimination because of race, color,
religious creed, ancestry, age, sex, national origin or handicap or disability,

but as to acts declared unlawful by section five of this act the procedure
herein provided shall when invoked, be exclusive and the final determination therein shall exclude any other action, civil or criminal, based on the
same grievance of the complaint concerned. If such complaint institutes any
action based on such grievance without resorting to the procedure provided
in this act, he may not subsequently resort to the procedure herein.'47

Thus, an aggrieved civil servant has a choice of the forum in which
he or she chooses to litigate. The State Civil Service Commission
currently has a practice of proceeding with a case appealed to it
even if the same case has been appealed to the Human Relations
Commission. As a practical matter, the Civil Service Commission
issues decisions more quickly than the Human Relations Commission which must, pursuant to the procedure set forth in section 9
of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, conduct an investigation to determine if probable cause exists.'" Accordingly, there has
not been as of yet a case in which the Human Relations Commission has issued a final adjudication prior to one being issued by the
Civil Service Commission. It is suggested, however, that once one
of the agencies issues a final decision which is not appealed the
principle of collateral estoppel would preclude the other agency
from finding facts to the contrary.' 49
147. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(b) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
148. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959(b) and (c) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
149. The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that "[wihere a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment,
the determination is conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action on a different
cause of action." McCarthy v. Township of McCandless, 7 Pa. Commw. 611, 619, 300 A.2d
815, 820 (1973) (quoting section 68(1) of Restatement of Judgments). The prior action operates only as an estoppel to those matters in issue which are identical, were actually litigated,
were essential to the judgment and were material to the adjudication. Id. at 619, 300 A.2d at
820-21.
One case which does consider the applicability of facts found by another agency, although
not in the context of collateral estoppel, is Allegheny County Children and Youth Services v.
Williams, 87 Pa. Commw. 77, 487 A.2d 47 (1985). In Allegheny County the appointing authority removed a houseparent, regular status, from his position at a youth shelter on the
basis of a Child Line and Abuse Registry report which evidenced "indicated abuse." This
finding of indicated abuse had not been appealed by Williams. The appointing authority
argued that Williams' failure to appeal the abuse report precluded him from appealing his
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A decision as to where to litigate a claim is a matter of legal
judgment. It is submitted, however, that where the allegation is
one involving procedural discrimination and hence the technical
complexities of the Civil Service Act the State Civil Service Commission is the forum with greater expertise in the area. Wise counsel should, however, take note of the more liberal statute of limitations applicable to the Human Relations Act. In cases where the
alleged discrimination can be pinpointed to, a particular date, the
complainant before the Human Relations Commission has ninety
days within which to file a complaint.1 50 Section 951(b) of the Civil
Service Act, however, provides for only a twenty day period1 51
measured from the date of the alleged violation (or its reasonable
discovery).1 52 In addition, the Human Relations Commission, purremoval to the State Civil Service Commission. The Commonwealth Court correctly noted
that both the issues and the remedies were different in the two proceedings. An appeal to
the Department of Public Welfare from the indicated report, which is established without a
due process hearing and thus composed of "unlitigated" findings, could result in expungement of the report. See section 15(d) of the Child Protective Services Law, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, § 2215(d) (Purdon Supp. 1986). In contrast, an appeal to the State Civil Service
Commission would focus upon the existence of just cause for removal and possible reinstatement and back pay. See also Spinola v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare (No. 205 C.D. 1985, filed
August 15, 1985) (unreported Commonwealth Court case holding that the Commission need
not consider the hearing transcript of a prior informal non-adversarial hearing conducted by
the appointing authority and that a finding of no willful misconduct by the Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review does not collaterally estop the State Civil Service Commission from finding just cause for removal).
150. 16 PA. CODE § 42.11(a) (Shepard's 1986).
151. See also 4 PA. CODE § 105.12 (Shepard's 1986).
152. Case law recognizes that one is unable to appeal an alleged discriminatory act
until one becomes aware of the discrimination. Thus, in Butler v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n,
57 Pa. Commw. 406, 426 A.2d 239 (1981), where female nurses alleging gender discrimination appealed their non-selections more than twenty days after the tentative selectee was
announced, the appeal was timely because the announcement letter did not indicate that
the selectee was male. The women did appeal within twenty days of learning the identity of
the candidate. Once the date of the incident is pinpointed, however, the time period for
appeal, whether under section 951(a) or section 951(b), is mandatory. See, e.g., Taylor v.
State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 67 Pa. Commw. 594, 447 A.2d 1098 (1982); Marks v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 7 Pa. Commw. 414, 299 A.2d 691 (1973). See also Schnieder v. State Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 77 Pa. Commw. 623, 466 A.2d 300 (1983) (employer's notice of removal is not
required to set forth twenty day appeal period); Edmonds v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 71 Pa.
Commw. 160, 454 A.2d 221 (1983) (appeal inadvertently addressed to Federal Civil Service
Commission and which was forwarded to State Civil Service Commission but arrived after
twenty day period was untimely); Pettit v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 4 Pa. Commw. 124, 285 A.2d
223 (1971) (appeal denied when attempted delivery of removal letter sent by certified mail
was unsuccessful and employee was notified of attempted delivery but letter went unclaimed); but see Roderick v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 76 Pa. Commw. 329, 463 A.2d 1261
(1983) (where employee alleges misdirection by appointing authority wherein it knew employee was pursuing wrong avenue of appeal but chose not to inform her of this after several
contacts by her attorney, a remand for findings on whether appeal nunc pro tunc should be
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suant to section 9(f) of its Act, has broad discretion in fashioning a
remedy including an order pertaining to reinstatement, back pay,
hiring and "upgrading.' 5 3 The Civil Service Commission is empowered pursuant to section 951 (b) to "make such order as it
deems appropriate to assure the person such rights as are accorded
him by [the] Act." Thus, in discrimination cases including those
involving removal, suspension, non-selection for promotion or demotion, an adequate remedy is available from either forum. Another factor to consider is that a complainant under the Human
Relations Act is provided with an attorney; this is not the case for
persons appealing to the Civil Service Commission.
Other distinctions to be aware of with respect to the two forums
include the method of pleading, discovery and post-hearing rights.
The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission complaint must
set forth the names of the complainant and the respondent and
"[sluch other information as may be required by the Commission." 5 Answers may be filed,' 5 5 any allegation of new matter is
deemed denied without the necessity of a reply'" and respondents
have the right to file a formal position statement. 5 ' Additionally,
complaints or answers may be amended at any time prior to the
approval of a hearing and thereafter by leave of the commissioners,
hearing commissioners or permanent hearing examiner.'
In instances where no probable cause is found, the complainant retains
the right to bring an action in the court of common pleas of the
jurisdiction where the alleged discrimination occurred.15 The
Human Relations Commission also has regulations establishing a
broad range of discovery procedures, which are available to it durallowed is appropriate).
153. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 959(f) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
154. 16 PA. CODE § 42.32(a) (Shepard's 1986).
155. 16 PA. CODE § 42.32(b) (Shepard's 1986).
156. 16 PA. CODE § 42.33(a) (Shepard's 1986).
157. 16 PA. CODE § 42.33(c) (Shepard's 1986).
158. 16 PA. CODE § 42.35(a) (Shepard's 1986). If the unlawful discriminatory practice
complained of is not eliminated before a hearing on the merits is approved, the complaint
may be amended to include additional material allegations disclosed by the investigation. 16
PA. CODE § 42.35(b) (Shepard's 1986).
159. 16 PA. CODE § 42.61(c) (Shepard's 1986). If probable cause is found the Commission "will endeavor to eliminate the unlawful discriminatory practice by conference, conciliation and persuasion." 16 PA. CODE § 42.71(b) (Shepard's 1986). The Human Relations
Commission regulations provide for pre-hearing discovery including protective orders, 16 PA.
CODE § 42.82 (Shepard's 1986), discovery of Commission records, 16 PA. CODE §§ 42.83-.84
(Shepard's 1986), interrogatories, 16 PA. CODE § 42.86 (Shepard's 1986), depositions, 16 PA.
CODE § 42.88 (Shepard's 1986), production of documents and materials, 16 PA. CODE § 42.91
(Shepard's 1986) and requests for admission, 16 PA. CODE § 42.94 (Shepard's 1986).
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ing the probable cause investigation stage. 60 Finally, the complainant may seek reconsideration of a case closing within ten days of
the receipt of notice of the closing of the complaint. 6 1
With respect to cases brought before the Civil Service Commission, case law has repeatedly established that under section 951(b)
of the Civil Service Act the employee must allege with specificity
the underlying basis for his claim of discrimination. 62 The Commission incorporates this requirement into its regulation and
reserves the right to dismiss a case which does not specify facts
alleging discrimination.' 6 3 It routinely does so sua sponte. No answer is required, nor specifically provided for in the Civil Service
regulations"' and an appeal form can be amended only at the discretion of the Commission. 65 Recently, the Commission adopted
regulations expanding discovery to include depositions and prehearing discovery of documents.' 6 6 Prior to the implementation of
160. 16 PA. CODE § 42.42 (Shepard's 1986). The investigatory discovery proceedings
available to the Human Relations Commission at this stage include oral interviews and production of documents, 16 PA. CODE § 42.43 (Shepard's 1986), interrogatories and answers to
interrogatories, 16 PA. CODE §§ 42.44-.45 (Shepard's 1986), subpoenas, 16 PA. CODE § 42.48
(Shepard's 1986), depositions, 16 PA. CODE § 42.51 (Shepard's 1986), and production of documents, information or material for inspection, copying or photographing, 16 PA. CODE §
42.54 (Shepard's 1986).
161. 16 PA. CODE § 42.62(d) (Shepard's 1986).
162. Hunter v. Jones, 417 Pa. 372, 207 A.2d 784 (1965), aff'd sub. nom. Hunter v. State
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 422 Pa. 158, 220 A.2d 879 (1966); Vovakes v. Dep't of Transp., 71 Pa.
Commw. 3, 453 A.2d 1072 (1982); Sienkiewicz v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 53 Pa. Commw. 445,
417 A.2d 874 (1980); Cunningham v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 17 Pa. Commw. 375, 332
A.2d 839 (1975). See also Somerset Mental Retardation Unit v. Sanders, 85 Pa. Commw.
549, 483 A.2d 1018 (1984) (Commission's post-hearing raising of procedural issue which was
not raised by either party prior to or at the hearing constituted a denial of due process).
163. 4 PA. CODE § 105.12(c) (Shepard's 1986).
164. In most instances, the aggrieved employee will receive a letter explaining the adverse personnel action. This will usually establish the appointing authority's position so that
a formal answer is not required. This letter is admitted into evidence at the hearing as a
Commission exhibit. It should be noted that while written notice is required for the most
common personnel actions, see 4 PA. CODE § 105.1-.2 (Shepard's 1986), a statement of reasons for the action is required only in the cases of removal, resignation by abandonment,
involuntary retirement, involuntary demotion or suspension of a regular status employee.
See 4 PA. CODE § 105.3 (Shepard's 1986).
165. 4 PA. CODE § 105.12(d) (Shepard's 1986). See also O'Byrne v. Dep't of Transp., 92
Pa. Commw. 286, 498 A.2d 1385 (1985), a case examining amendment of an appeal form
pursuant to the General Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure, 1 PA. CODE §§ 31.1
- 35.251 (Shepard's 1986) (mistakenly designated in the opinion as Commission regulations).
O'Byrne suggests that in a section 951(a) case an amendment to include a section 951(b)
claim beyond the twenty day appeal period may be the injection of a new cause of action
beyond the appeal period.
166. 4 PA. CODE § 105.14(a) and § 105.14(b) (Shepard's 1986). Regulation 105.14(a)
replaces the Commission's prior rule relating to subpoenas. Regulation 105.14(b), which gov-
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these regulations, discovery was limited to subpoenas for documents which were exchanged at the beginning of or during the
hearing, unless counsel agreed to an earlier exchange, and subpoenas ad testificandum. 167 Thus, where extensive pre-trial discovery
is needed, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission may be
the more effective forum because of its broad discovery provisions
and its practice in actually implementing them. As with the
Human Relations Commission, the State Civil Service Commission
does permit petitions for reconsideration.16 8 The petitions must be
filed within ten calendar days of the issuance of the
adjudication. 6 '
XIII.

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

The Civil Service Act has been the subject of a number of con70
stitutional challenges on grounds such as veterans preference'
mandatory retirement, 7 ' free speech and association 72 and equal
erns depositions and discovery of documents, has been effective only since March 30, 1985.
See 15 Pa. Admin. Bull. 1151.
167. The Commission's expansion of discovery to the prehearing phase was, in the
author's view, long overdue, especially in section 951(b) cases where the employee has the
burden. The inaccessibility to documents was especially detrimental in the procedural discrimination cases and in cases involving a comparison theory. Additionally, at least one
judge of the Commonwealth Court believes that the denial of pre-hearing discovery violates
due process. See Turzai v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 90 Pa. Commw. 374, 495 A.2d 639 (1985)
(Kalish, J., dissenting). But see E. Pa. Psychiatric Inst. v. Russell, 77 Pa. Commw. 390, 401,
465 A.2d 1313, 1319 (1983), where the court in the context of a furlough case wrote:
The employees also assert that they were denied due process by the lack of pre-trial
discovery. A review of the record, however, indicates counsel for the employees was
allowed to review documents in an adequate manner prior to the hearing. Employees'
contention that they were entitled to a broader form of discovery has not been substantiated by any case law suggesting that such a right exists in administrative hearings. In the absence of such a right, the fact that some adequate form of discovery
was allowed is sufficient to show that no violation of due process right occurred.
168. 4 PA. CODE § 105.17 (Shepard's 1986).
169. 4 PA. CODE § 105.17(c) (Shepard's 1986).
170. Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
171. Delaware County Child Care Services v. Goodley, 53 Pa. Commw. 333, 417 A.2d
868 (1980) (where contract between State Civil Service Commission and local agency provided that local agency's practice of mandatory retirement shall continue, contract provision
was controlling under Commission regulation 93.8, 4 PA. CODE § 93.8 (Shepard's 1986)). This
regulation provides that services of the Commission are available to other agencies via contractual agreement. The Goodley court also indicated that a mandatory retirement policy is
not discriminatory per se under Pennsylvania law.
172. Farview State Hosp. v. Urda, 23 Pa. Commw. 607, 353 A.2d 61 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977) (prohibition in section 904 of Civil Service Act against taking an
active part in political management or political campaigns does not violate state or federal
constitutional rights to free speech and free association); Sauers v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 76
Pa. Commw. 504, 464 A.2d 635 (1983) (employee's critical remarks of superior, which re-
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protection. 1 73 There have also been challenges to extrajudicial inquiry,174 proper separation of functions,' 7 bias 76 and the absence
of one or more members of the Commission from the hearing.'7
These cases, however, do not emanate from an attack upon section
905.1 of the Act. Thus, detailed discussion of them is not appropriate for the focus of this paper.
There are, however, two due process issues which are repeatedly
raised in both section 951(a) and section 951(b) claims, and which
merit closer attention. The first concerns notice of charges. Both
section 950 of the Civil Service Act 17 and Commission regulation
105.2179 specify personnel actions requiring notice. Although under
this regulation most personnel actions directly affecting pay and
present benefits require notice, indirect actions such as non-selection or non-promotion do not. In addition, although under section
950 probationary employees are entitled to notice of personnel actions taken with respect to them, they are not entitled to a statement of reasons for the actions. 8 0 Accordingly, the suspension, demotion or removal notice of a probationary employee will often be
marks were not related to matters of political or social concern, could serve as a basis for
discipline without first amendment violation occurring).
173. Haines v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 58 Pa. Commw. 640, 428 A.2d 759 (1981)
(Civil Service Act did not violate equal protection by establishing distinctions between regular and probationary employees).
174. Freedman v. Dep't of Gen. Services, 38 Pa. Commw. 229, 392 A.2d 352 (1978)
(dismissal of appeal based upon extrajudicial inquiry is prohibited where statute requires a
public hearing).
175. Wasniewski v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 7 Pa. Commw. 166, 299 A.2d 676 (1973).
176. Silvia v. Pennhurst Center Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 63 Pa. Commw. 75, 437 A.2d
535 (1981); Tempero v. Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 44 Pa. Commw. 235, 239 n.3, 403 A.2d
226, 229 n.3 (1979).
177. Turzai v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 90 Pa. Commw. 374, 380 n.6, 495 A.2d 639, 642
n.6 (1985); Caldwell v. Clearfield County Children and Youth Services, 83 Pa. Commw. 49,
476 A.2d 996 (1984); Kakas v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 65 Pa. Commw. 550, 442 A.2d 1243
(1982); Fleming v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 13 Pa. Commw. 421, 319 A.2d 185 (1974);
Siegel v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 9 Pa. Commw. 256, 305 A.2d 736 (1973).
178. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 741.950 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
179. 4 PA. CODE. § 105.2 (Shepard's 1986).
180. Commission regulation 105.3, 4 PA. CODE § 105.3 (Shepard's 1986), which governs
statement of reasons, refers only to regular status employees. See note 164. This position is
in conformity with Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972), wherein
the United States Supreme Court held that a non-tenured college professor who had no
right to continued employment and was not rehired, was not constitutionally entitled to a
statement of reasons for the state action or to a hearing. The Roth Court did note, however,
that had the state made charges which would have damaged Roth's "standing and associations in his community," or imposed a stigma on him which would have "foreclosed his
freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities," the result may well have
been different. Id. at 573.
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a statement only that the employee is being disciplined for "unsatisfactory performance." The multitude of cases holding that an
employee must receive notice which enables him to discern the
charges and adequately prepare a defense, are cases involving regular status employees. 81 There is no requirement that a probationary employee be given a statement of reasons for an adverse
personnel action, because his appeal is limited to issues of discrimination where he bears the burden of proof.
A related issue is the question of whether one is entitled to a
pre-termination hearing. The United States Supreme Court in
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 82 recently decided
that with respect to a regular status civil servant, a pre-termination hearing is required to satisfy due process, but that such hearing need be only an initial check. Thus, as long as the employee is
given notice of the charges, explanation of the employer's evidence
and an opportunity to respond in an informal pre-termination
hearing, due process is satisfied. There is nothing to suggest that
18 3
Loudermill was meant to apply to probationary employees.

XIV.

REMEDIES

Under section 951(b) of the Civil Service Act, the Commission's
power to make an appropriate order is limited to assuring that the
employee receives the rights given him by the statute.1 84 The Commission routinely orders reinstatement. It has on one occasion,
where an employee was not removed but his duties were taken
181. See, e.g., Chavis v. Philadelphia County Bd. of Assistance, Dep't of Pub. Welfare,
29 Pa. Commw. 205, 370 A.2d 445 (1977); Benjamin v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 17 Pa.
Commw. 427, 332 A.2d 585 (1975); Wood v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 49 Pa. Commw. 383, 411
A.2d 281 (1980). It is clear that a statement of reasons which is insufficient can be amended.
Rizzo v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 17 Pa. Commw. 474, 333 A.2d 212 (1975). See also Lylo v.
Dep't of Envtl. Resources, 83 Pa. Commw. 101, 477 A.2d 897 (1984).
182.
- U.S.-.,
105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
183. The Commonwealth Court has specifically applied LoudermiU to the State Civil
Service Act. See Adamovich v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, Pa. Commw. __,
504 A.2d 952
(1986). But Adamovich, like Loudermill, involved a regular status employee. Older cases
hold that there is no right to a pre-termination hearing (presumably a full-blown hearing).
See, e.g., Gorby v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 57 Pa. Commw. 312, 426 A.2d 223 (1981); Beville
v. State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 15 Pa. Commw. 341, 327 A.2d 196 (1974); Williams v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 9 Pa. Commw. 437, 306 A.2d 419 (1973), afJ'd, 457 Pa. 470, 327 A.2d 70
(1974); Grausam v. Murphey, 448 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 405 U.S. 981
(1972). These cases all involve regular status employees. The issue of whether Adamovich
applies to probationary employees remains undecided.
184. See also Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Baker, 82 Pa. Commw. 86,
474 A.2d 415 (1984).
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from him, ordered reinstatement of the duties. ' In cases involving
non-selection, the Commission, upon a finding of discrimination,
usually directs that the employee be offered the next available position. On occasion, where the appointing authority has repeatedly
followed procedures which the Commission has rejected, it will order that the position be vacated and direct that the aggrieved employee be placed in the position. With respect to the grant or denial of back pay, the Commission has wide discretion in such
matters,' 8 but the denial of back pay must be based upon job related factors which touch upon competency and ability to do the
job.'8 7 Thus, if the Commission finds a removal or suspension to
have been discriminatory, a denial of back pay would probably
constitute an abuse of discretion.
XV.

SUMMARY

Under the Pennsylvania Civil Service Act, section 905.1 has been
frequently used not only to remedy the traditional forms of discrimination, but also to provide redress for mistakes. This broad
reading of section 905.1 provides aggrieved employees with standing to enforce the procedural requirements of the Act. This in turn
operates to allow employees to participate personally in insuring
the fairness in employment that the Act seeks to achieve, and to
assist the State Civil Service Commission in policing the Act.
When the reasons for this broad reading of discrimination are understood by the litigants and the courts, the result will be a more
effective application of the law, which will better implement the
Act's goal of greater efficiency in government through the application of the merit concept.

185. Dep't of Gen. Services v. Johnson, 45 Pa. Commw. 245, 405 A.2d 596 (1979).
186. Fiegenberg v. Dep't of Labor and Indust., 33 Pa. Cornmw. 570, 382 A.2d 498
(1978).
187. See, e.g., Justice v. Youth Dev. Center, 74 Pa. Commnw. 531, 460 A.2d 876 (1983).
It is well settled that denial of back pay is a penalty. See, e.g., Baron v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
8 Pa. Commw. 6, 301 A.2d 427 (1973).
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Appendix A
DISCRIMINATION 961 (b)
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Pa. Civil Service Act

Appendix B
* PART III - 951(b) ALL EMPLOYESIPERSONS ALLEGING DISCRIMINATION

SECTION 905.1. Prohibition of Discrimination. - No officer or empine of [he Commonwealth Shall discriminate
against any person in recruitment. examination, appotnlment. training, promotion, retention. or any other personnel action
on
with respect to the classified service because of politicat or religious opinions or affiliations, because of labor I
affilialions. or because of race. natonal origin, or other non-meri factors
SECTION 961. Heariegs.
(bI Any person who is aggrieved by an alleged violation of Section 905 1 of this act may appenl in writing to the
commission within twenty calendar days of the alleged violation. Upon receipt of such notice of ippeal. the coilmiSslon
shall promptly schedule and hold a public hearing. As soon as practicable after the conclusion of the hearing, the omiSsion
shall report its findings and conclusions to the aggrieved person and other interested porti5s, If such final de'cision is in favor
of the aggrieved person.I he commissin shall make such order as it deems appropriate to assure the person such r ights as are
accorded him by thisact.
EMPLOYESWHO DO NOT HAVE REGULAR STATUSAND NON EMPLOYESWHO ARE ALLEGING DISCRIMINATION MAY
ONLY APPEAL UNDER THIS PART. REGULAR STATUS EMPLOYESALLEGING DISCRIMINATION ALSO MAY APPEAL
UNDER THIS PART. THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE APPELLANT. INDICATE THE TYPEIS) OF ACTION(S) BEING
APPEALED.
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M. WILL YOU REREPRESENTEDBY AN ATTORNEY?
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REQUESTFOR A HEARING IS GRANTED?
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(IF YOU RETAIN AN ATTORNEY LATER YOU MUST
INFORM THE APPE LS DIVISION, STATE CIVIL SERVICE
P.O. ROX S69, HARRISBURG, PA 17120.
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(717) 73-29241.I

